

# **INCREASING SOFT POWER – A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S BID TO HOST THE FIFA 2010 WORLD CUP**

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
**APRIL 2004**

## DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

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## ABSTRACT

This study attempts to determine if South Africa was actively attempting to boost its soft power or symbolic power during the country's bid to host the Fifa 2010 World Cup. Preceding works dealing with mega-events identified a number of potential benefits to the hosting nation. Some of these benefits include opportunities for development (sport and socio-economic), nation building, urban regeneration, and marketing. Previous works have focused a great deal on economic and nation building aspects of mega-events. The marketing possibility for a host to develop as a tourist destination has also enjoyed some focus.

There also exists a large amount of literature dealing with power – its nature, resources and types. There is for instance structural and relational power while, in the traditional sense, wealth and military might may be seen as power resources. However, the importance and maintenance of soft power – or symbolic or co-optive power, as defined in this study – has been greatly overshadowed by the traditional ideas of power and as a result, neglected by International Relations scholars.

This study links the marketing potential of mega-events with the deployment of soft power. The case study specifically deals with South Africa's World Cup bid as a marketing forum for enhancing the country's soft power. For such an analysis it is necessary to investigate South Africa's diplomatic status, global position, relationship with the North and South, and power resources. The importance of soft power being essential to South Africa's specific situation, global position and future, is also investigated.

Using the bid for the 2010 World Cup, this study concludes that South Africa was indeed projecting specifically chosen images of the country with the intention of enhancing the country's soft power. It is furthermore argued that these images are both a reflection and in support of South Africa's foreign policy and emerging middle power position.

## OPSOMMING

Hierdie studie poog om vas te stel of Suid Afrika doelgerig probeer het om die land se sagte mag te versterk tydens die Fifa 2010 Wêreldbekerbod. Vorige studies oor grootskaalse gebeurtenisse meen dat dit sekere potensieële voordele inhou vir die gasheer. Dit sluit in geleenthede vir ontwikkeling (sport en sosio-ekonomies), nasie-bou, en stedelike herlewing en bemaking. Vorige werke het ook meerendeels gefokus op die ekonomiese en nasie-bou aspekte van grootskaalse gebeurtenisse. Die bemarkingsvoordele wat dit inhou vir die gasheer se toerismebedryf is ook gereeld verhandel.

Daar bestaan ook vele geskrewe werke oor mag. Verskillende bronne van mag is ondermeer 'n gewilde onderwerp. Daar is byvoorbeeld strukturele mag en verhoudings mag. Tradisioneel word militêre en ekonomiese vermoëns gesien as bronne van mag. Die belangrikheid van sagte mag of simboliese mag, soos dit in hierdie studie gedefinieër word, is egter tot 'n groot mate oorskadu deur tradisionele idees van mag. Daardeur het Internasionale Betrekkinge akademici dit ook tot 'n mate afgeskeep.

Hierdie studie illustreer die bemarkingspotensiaal wat grootskaalse gebeurtenisse inhou vir sagte mag. Die gevallestudie handel spesifiek oor Suid Afrika se 2010 bod as 'n potensieële bemarkingsforum vir die bevordering van die land se sagte mag. Die analise het vereis dat Suid Afrika se diplomatieke status, globale posisie, verhouding met die Noorde en Suide, en bronne van mag behandel word. Die belangrikheid van sagte mag vir Suid Afrika se toekoms word ook aangespreek.

Die gevolgtrekking is dat Suid Afrika wel gepoog het om sekere gekose beelde na die buiteland te projekteer. Die spesifieke doel met die beelde was om die land se sagte mag uit te brei. 'n Verdere bevinding is dat die beelde gelyktydig Suid Afrika se buitelandse beleid en ontluikende middel magposisie gereflekteer het.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:**

ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSC	African Peace and Security Council
AU	African Union
CAF	Confederation of African Football
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GCIS	Government Communication and Information System
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa Forum
IMC	International Marketing Council of South Africa
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organisations
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
Nepad	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAP	Pan African Parliament
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SASC	South African Sports Commission
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation



# CHAPTER I


## INTRODUCTION

“Sport is probably the most effective means of communication in the modern world, bypassing both verbal and written communication and reaching directly out to billions of people worldwide”

– President Nelson Mandela, 1996 (Beck, 2004:77).

### 1.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Modern sport has an inescapable influence on the domestic and foreign policies of all governments. Invariably domestic and foreign policies influence sport. No government can deny these facts since “modern sport represents a major political, economic, social and cultural force in today’s world” (Beck, 2004: 90). International Relations scholars have recognised the importance of sport to their field of study. Although this has been neglected in the past it has changed in recent years. The political, social and economic dimensions of mega sporting events and sport associations are some sports-related areas that have enjoyed growing attention.



Major sporting events are especially analysed in terms of the potential benefits they hold, or in terms of the benefits their adherents claim to possess. The more important benefits are associated with economic gain, nation building, socio-economic development, and marketing potential (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Gratton & Taylor, 2000; Hiller, 2000). The potential benefit that is considered key to this study is the potential of mega sporting events to enhance the international prestige of the host nation. Levermore (2004: 21) stated that beside United Nations membership, membership of international sports associations is the clear signal that a country is recognised by the international community. This is even more relevant if a state is awarded the right to host mega sports events. South Korea’s hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games is one such example (Buzo, 2002: 173). It had shown that the international community acknowledged that South Korea gained significant diplomatic and

economic power in the international system, as well as the Asian region. Herein lie the potential benefits for a country's soft power.

This study will view soft power as a non-coercive means to either establish cooperation, or to achieve own or collective gain, by means of attractive and legitimate authority and power, as well as other intangible aspects such as culture, ideology and institutions<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, it will become evident that greater international prestige and the boosting of soft power are closely dependent on one another. It is argued that states are actively attempting to enhance their international prestige by bidding and hosting mega sporting events. One of the first well-known examples where a state used a major sporting event to conduct foreign policy and to further its international prestige is Nazi Germany's hosting of the 1936 Berlin Olympics (Roche, 18, 104). It is even more relevant when considering Hall's (1994: 160) argument that mega-events may strengthen "dominant ideologies or further individual interests, legitimise hegemonic relationships and change the meaning and structure of place". Some of these are applicable to Nazi objectives in the 1930s.

Black & Van der Westhuizen (2004) argue that governments also make use of mega sporting events to "signal" to the international community the changes and developments that the country has undergone. This was especially the case during Malaysia's hosting of the 1998 Commonwealth Games. Silk (2001: 286) said, among other goals, the Malaysian government intended to "showcase" itself as a developed country. It is of course a status that Malaysia desperately wanted to acquire and maintain. Malaysia is of course a developing country. However, the attempt to showcase itself as developed is based on the assumption that it would raise Malaysia's international prestige, among other potential benefits.

Cornelissen (2004a & 2004b) argues that a growing number of developing countries and especially African countries are increasingly competing for the hosting of mega sporting events. These countries are often motivated by the potential benefits namely economic gain, nation building, socio-economic development and marketing. She identifies South Africa as no stranger when it came to bidding for and hosting mega sporting events (without a doubt


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<sup>1</sup> A more detailed discussion and definition for soft power is supplied in Section 1.4.1.

also motivated by the same potential benefits). It is then of interest to determine to what extent boosting the country's international prestige and soft power forms part of the motivation to host mega sporting events.

South African sports such as rugby and cricket – in the competitive sense – have been of relatively high standards for a number of years. This had been the case even during apartheid. Nevertheless, mounting international sanctions, boycotts and general isolation took its toll on sport as well. Near total isolation from sport had the effect that South Africa could not make use of sport or sporting events to enhance its soft power. The country's first chance to attempt this came in 1992, when it was allowed to compete in sporting events such as the Olympic Games in Barcelona.

After 1994 South Africa emerged with great moral influence, given the peaceful transition to democracy and fight for human rights. It allowed South Africa to often punch above its weight. In its immediate region and the African continent South Africa was seeking to resolve numerous conflicts. Even internationally the country tried its hand at contributing to resolving conflicts in the Middle East and Ireland. In addition, there is South Africa's role as intermediary for, and representative of both the developed and developing worlds to consider (Barber, 2004: 147-200).



Within the regional and continental context South Africa was indisputably dominant. Other African states could not break from their dependence on South Africa's economy and infrastructure (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 13, 14). There was also no significant military threat in the immediate region. Yet, in global terms, South Africa lacked the more traditional power resources such as military and economic capability. Because of this disjuncture between South Africa's regional and to some extent continental significance (limited in global terms) its foreign policy rapidly exhibited typical so-called middle power characteristics. Multilateralism became the cornerstone of its foreign policy as it joined numerous organisations, agreements and treaties, in many instances as the leader (Barber, 2004; Nel, Taylor & Van der Westhuizen, 2000). South Africa also sought to establish itself as spokesperson for the developing world. For one, the country became very vocal about the

need for substantive changes to what was perceived as an inherently unequal global trading system (Nicola, 2001: 3, 16, 19-23).

Increasingly, the need to enhance its image as a leader of the developing world became more important. As argued in later chapters, it is believed that South Africa has to rely on significant amounts of soft power to support its diplomatic status, its goals and initiatives, and leadership aspirations. Accordingly, hosting mega-events, especially in sport, became an important strategy to expand its soft power. Since the 1990s South Africa has been bidding for numerous such events and also hosted a considerable amount. For example, South Africa played host to the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the Africa Cup of Nations in 1996, the African Games in 1999 and the 2003 Cricket World Cup. There were also the failed bids for the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 Federation Internationale de Football Association (Fifa) World Cup. South Africa's latest bid for a mega sporting event was for Fifa 2010. The 24-member Fifa executive had their final vote on May 15, 2004 and South Africa was announced as the host for 2010.

South Africa's bid campaign for the 2010 World Cup is the case study for this thesis. For one, it is the latest bid in a long line of bids. Therefore, if South Africa uses mega sporting events as a forum to boost the country's international prestige, it has had considerable time and experience to perfect its technique. Never before has the country hosted a sporting event of such great stature that reaches the biggest audience in the world. Some are of the opinion that it is the biggest event in the world (Lee, 2004). Since it is the most ambitious of all bids, this thesis examines the extent to which South Africa attempted to boost its soft power and prestige during the campaign.

## **1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND AIM OF THE STUDY**

This study investigates that South Africa consciously attempted to boost its soft power during the bid for the Fifa 2010 World Cup. This is executed in the context of South Africa as an emerging middle power. Accordingly the need for sufficient soft power (defined in 1.4.1.) as support for South Africa's foreign policy and role as an emerging middle power is also considered.

The case study of South Africa's 2010 World Cup bid will then be analysed to determine if and how the country may have had employed the bid to boost its soft power. The objective is to identify and examine clear attempts and means to enhance soft power and not to determine if these attempts were successful or not.

### **1.3. QUESTIONS FOR INVESTIGATION**

To establish whether South Africa as a middle power is actively seeking ways to boost its soft power, especially by the country's bid to host the Fifa 2010 World Cup, this study is guided by the following questions:

- What does South Africa's soft power consist of? What role does soft power play in South Africa's particular diplomatic status? In other words: where, when and why is the support of soft power required?
- What exactly is South Africa's middle power role? Is it different from general middle power behaviour and characteristics? For instance, do the country's geographical position, history and socio-economic and political situation determine its specific type of middlepoweriship? How and where does South Africa's middlepoweriship manifest in the country's foreign policy and actions?
- Did South Africa make use of the Fifa 2010 bid as a potential forum for marketing and boosting the country's soft power and how was this attempted?

### **1.4. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALISATION**

Concepts that are central to this study are: soft power, mega sporting events, state roles and images and the global division of the world into North and South. This section will investigate these concepts in the light of existing literature. It will supply the theoretical background that will create a context for later chapters where South Africa's emerging middle power (role, aspirations, soft power) are linked to the country's participation in bidding for mega sporting events, in this instance specifically the Fifa 2010 bid.

### 1.4.1. Soft Power

Literature dealing with soft power, as it is defined in this study, is scarce. More often than not the focus falls on structural or hard relational power. This is partly the result of the strong realist view of power in international relations theory. To arrive at a satisfactory conceptualisation of soft power, the realist perception of power is also exactly from where this discussion commences.

Waltz (1954: 205) stated that the “cardinal rule” of the game of international politics is to “do whatever you must in order to win it”. Already from this it becomes apparent that in realist terms power is tied to the notions of self-help and self-interest. Morgenthau held that realism views international politics as “a struggle for power” that is understood through “interests defined as power” (Keohane, 1989: 39). Waltz (1954: 205) also referred to power as “the capacity to produce an intended effect”. Thus, from Waltz and Morgenthau we gather that the search for power and resources of power are intrinsic to states. In addition, power or rather the influence of power is needed to achieve and protect state goals and interests.

Keohane (1989: 54) said that realist theorists “are using power to refer to resources that can be used to induce other actors to do what they would not otherwise do, in accordance with the desires of the power-wielder”. Resources of power are of great importance to defining soft power in this study. Power resources point to particular types of power. For instance, military might and economic wealth could lead to considerable hard power. Traditional realism predominately viewed power resources in such coercive terms (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 11). As a result, traditional realism has an inability or lack of interest in defining soft power. Traditional realism’s focus on hard power resources is still relevant, but the resources that generate power have become much more complex. It is more difficult to maintain ‘power over outcomes’ because the international system has become more intricate – there are more actors and issues. What is of great importance too is that weaker states are more self-asserting (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 11). This is based on the idea of ‘strength in numbers’ and multilateral cooperation and institutions. Thus, power resources and power types have changed for strong and weak states alike. In modern times states must increasingly search for new power resources and ways to successfully convert it into new types of power.

From the sub-field of global political economy, Susan Strange (1988: 24-29) referred to the traditional realist definition of power as relational power, which she contrasted to structural power. Relational power consists of hard power and is usually associated with more coercive sources and actions such as military deterrents and wealth. Structural power is defined as the power that “shape and determine the structures of the global political economy.” It is believed that structural power far outweighs relational power in the modern international political economy (Cox, 1996: 183). Nevertheless the point is that authors identify a variety of power types and resources. Alternatively the literature still deals with types and resources of power mostly in terms of tangible assets. An important departure emerged with Joseph Nye’s distinction between hard and soft power.

Joseph Nye (1990) also argued that states define power as the ability to control others. He said that states mostly define power resources in tangible terms such as “population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability” (Nye, 1997: 51). In addition Nye (1997: 52-53, 118) identified soft power that he distinguished from other types of power as an “indirect way to exercise power”. It is based on the idea that a given state with sufficient and effective soft power would receive the voluntary cooperation of other countries. Nye (1990: 181) interchangeably referred to this as soft or co-optive power:

A country may achieve the outcome it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power – that is, getting others to want what you want – might be called indirect or co-optive power behaviour. The ability to establish the preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions.

Hence for co-optive power to be effective ( to get others to want what you want and thereby influence outcomes ) it must be viewed as legitimate while the country’s culture, ideology and institutions must be more than merely acceptable to other states – it must be attractive.



Although other authors don't directly refer to soft or co-optive power, they do recognise that it is crucial for a state's power to be viewed as legitimate.

Strange (1997: 4) said that for structural power to become authority, the beliefs that sustain "the way things are done" must be perceived as legitimate by "international institutions, states, firms, and people". Mushakoji (1997: 86) stated that it is impossible to build legitimacy on brute force. He also argued that 'legitimacy' turns brute force into power. The difference lies in the approval and legitimacy of the state's power by the international community. 'Legitimacy' in this sense should not be confused with legitimacy as based on the universally accepted sovereignty of the state. It is rather when a state's culture, ideology, institutions and leadership are universally recognized as legitimate by state and non-state actors in the international society.

Accordingly, this study will view soft power as a non-coercive means to either establish cooperation, or to achieve own or collective gain, by means of attractive and legitimate authority and power, as well as other intangible aspects such as culture, ideology and institutions. Because soft or co-optive power is partly gained through features that appear effective and popular to others, it can also be referred to as 'symbolic power'. Thus, soft or co-optive or symbolic power<sup>2</sup> is enhanced through gaining international prestige. *Vice versa*, international prestige is enhanced through, for instance, symbolic power.

It is apparent that the above definition of soft power may lead to questioning the importance or effectiveness of soft power when compared to the dominant structural and relational powers. The definition of soft power should not be viewed exclusively as an alternative to structural and relational power. It should also be viewed as a means to support or legitimise relational and structural power. As stated, Strange said structural power must be viewed as legitimate. Mushakoji said legitimacy turns force into power. Thus, soft power can have a legitimising effect on more coercive types of powers. In addition, Nye (2004a & 2004b) argued that in the long run a greater deployment of soft power would be more effective and cheaper than reliance on expensive hard power. Also, coercive power is more likely to be

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<sup>2</sup> These terms will be used interchangeably.



damaging to how the international community view a state's power and authority. Nye refers to the growing anti-American sentiment based on the over-reliance of the U.S. government on hard power. Nye's writing on the importance of soft power is more in terms of major powers. This study will point to the significance soft power holds for smaller powers, like South Africa.

Nations have different types and amounts of power resources. Hegemons may rely more on structural and relational power. Weaker states do not have this luxury. This is where power conversion becomes important. Not all states have the ability to successfully convert potential resources into 'realised power' (Nye, 1997: 52). Skilful conversion of power is especially relevant where a state's more noticeable resources of power (military and economic) are outweighed by those of bigger players in the international environment. The strategy for weaker states is accordingly based on attraction and not coercion. This is where the importance of potential soft power resources could be converted into realised power. Determining quantitatively whether this has in fact occurred, is of course extremely difficult, given that the outcomes are not as tangible as in the case of hard power.

To enhance its soft power and thereby experience greater cooperation, a state must convey the effectiveness and prestige of its culture, ideology, institutions and foreign policy to the international community. There must be international awareness of these aspects. In other words, the international community must be informed and for this, among other things, a country must be able to market itself to the international community.

A state's position in the international hierarchy and power resources will dictate to what extent it should rely on soft power. If soft power makes up a significant portion of its entire power reserves, it is in that state's best interest to actively seek out all possible ways that may increase its soft power. These include opportunities with the potential to showcase or market the state's culture, ideology, institutions and foreign policies in an attractive manner – opportunities that will legitimise the state's power in the eyes of the world. For this study the main concern in terms of opportunities for marketing a country and thereby increasing soft power, resides with the bidding for and hosting of mega sporting events.

### 1.4.2. Mega Sporting Events

Mega-events in general are described by Roche (2000:1) as “large scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance.” Mega-events are organised by national governmental and international non-governmental organisations, or variations thereof, which makes them “official versions of public culture”. Cornelissen (2004a: 2), with specific reference to sport mega-events, said they “are quite specific in form and objective. It refers to major, short-term sporting festivals of worldwide status that are held on a regular basis”. Hiller (2000) also explained that “mega-events are short-term high profile events like Olympics and World Fairs”.

Mega sporting events have always been popular spectator events while the hosting of such events have become increasingly sought after by states. Initially it was mostly the developed world that seemed interested and capable in hosting mega sporting events. However, more recently, a growing number of developing states have become involved in the bidding and hosting of such events (Cornelissen, 2004a: 2). Various reasons are ascribed to this phenomenon as stated by Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004: 1205):

The pursuit and sponsorship of major games has become an increasingly popular strategy of governments, corporations, and other “boosters” world-wide, who habitually argue that major developmental, political, and socio-cultural benefits will flow from them, easily justifying the costs and risks involved. These arguments may have particular resonance in “semi-peripheral” polities, seeking heightened visibility and prestige in the context of globalisation.

Levermore (2004) discussed the relationship between sport and international relations. The opinion was that sport can explain a lot about international relations. It is not necessary to look further than the apartheid South African state for an example. By excluding South Africa from international sport and sporting bodies, the international community’s contempt for the government’s policies was reflected. Black & Van der Westhuizen (2004: 1205-1211) furthermore argued that proponents of mega sporting events are of the opinion that these events could help with identity-building and signalling, marketing, development, promoting political liberalisation and human rights. The latter is very much self-explaining.

This clearly exemplifies the potential of major sporting events to promote political liberalisation and human rights.

The potential for development, as a spin-off of hosting a major event, has received significant attention. First there is the potential of developing local sport. In addition there are the economic and social development processes brought about by major sporting events. Hall (1994: 160) pointed to the “centre city revitalisation...that is viewed as a major ingredient of economic development”. The revitalisation is of course a consequence of redevelopment projects aimed at accommodating hallmark events – sport and other. Hiller (2000) argued that mega-events are seen as potential capital accumulators. In a study of the Cape Town Bid for the 2004 Olympics he noted that the emphasis fell on human development. This included job creation and urban regeneration. Gratton & Taylor (2000: 118, 179-181) also named job creation and urban regeneration as potential spin-offs of major sporting events. They include the possibility for generating revenue through for instance, tourism, merchandise and ticket sales.

The main focus of this study still resides with the identity building and signalling, and marketing benefits mega sporting events are believed to have. Identity building and signalling do have a domestic as well as an international dimension, both of which have to do with “building nations, nation states and national identities” (Levermore, 2004:16). For this study the focus is however directed to the international dimension. Accordingly, signalling means the “desire to signal key developments or changes, both at home and abroad (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004: 1205). It goes hand in hand with the potential of mega-events to market the host country and/or city to the international community. Hall (1994: 160, 163) said that governments view hallmark events almost always as beneficial “because of their ability to promote appropriate images of places...and state interests may be enhanced through the promotion of politically dominant values”.

For these reasons, the interest of this thesis lies with the connection between mega sports events and the potential it holds for enhancing soft power. It has been stated that soft power is only effective if it is attractive and legitimate in the eyes of the world. It is the reason why

this study is especially interested in the political signalling of mega sporting events as a means to promote any particular (or chosen) aspect of the host nation. Roche (2000:6) points to the potential of mega-events in presenting the host nation to the world:

They (mega-events) represented and continue to represent key occasions in which nations could construct and present images of themselves for recognition in relation to other nations and in the eyes of the world. They represent and continue to represent key occasions in which national tradition and community, including a national past, present and future (national progress, potential and destiny), could be invented and imagined not just by and for leaders and citizens of the host nation, but also for and by publics of other nations.

Gratton & Taylor (2000: 181) say that mega sporting events present “unique marketing opportunities”, as the growing competition under broadcasters led to blanket coverage and expanded media coverage at peak times. Considering the fact that mega sporting events are watched by huge international audiences, it is obvious that the marketing benefits are seriously increased. But ‘unique marketing opportunities’ should not only be viewed in commercial or tourism terms. Hiller (2000) argued that mega-events could be analysed and used as tools for promoting government’s policy. He also says that governments link mega-events to “its own objectives of aggrandizement.” So, governments are biased in favour of supporting these events that present the opportunity to support and market government policy to the domestic population and international community.

Beck (2004: 77) highlighted that hosting major events like the Olympics or Fifa World Cup, is intimately linked to promoting the international prestige of the host nation. Thus, taking into consideration what was stated in the preceding section, if international prestige is enhanced it will necessarily boost soft power. This is even more significant considering that the host nation usually has a more powerful role in the sporting event than the guest nations (Roche, 2000:9-10). After all, the event is taking place within the sovereign territory of the host nation. Since mega-events are huge media events, the host nation may use this superior and advantageous influence to promote any particular aspect it chooses. These media moments enable the host nation to project multiple images and messages. From projecting the country’s moral and ideological views to showcasing new technologies, investment

opportunities, and its various tourist destinations (Gratton & Taylor, 2000: 181; Roche, 2000: 10). Conversely, the opportunity could also be used to downplay any existing negative aspects and images. Beck (2004: 78) refers to this as “sport’s propaganda potential in terms of reflecting and enhancing, as well as diminishing.”

There are thus various motivations for states to host mega-events. It is also clear that some motivations are linked to the potential of mega-events to promote and market a country in one way or another. Furthermore, this ‘promotion’ or ‘marketing’ has to do with creating and projecting favourable images of the host nation in the eyes of the world. These projected images, it is argued, will boost the nation’s soft power. The projected images could additionally support specific roles the host nation may fulfil or would want to fulfil. It is therefore necessary for this study to understand what is meant by ‘roles’ and ‘images’.

#### **1.4.3. State Images and Roles**

An exhaustive discussion on state images and roles is not required for this study. It is necessary to have an understanding of what is meant by state roles or the images the host nation wants to project. State roles and images are both connected to foreign policy objectives and behaviour. Holsti (1967: 158), in reference to policy-making and policy-makers, argued that humans act according to the image of their environments. In this context he defines image as:

an individual's perceptions of an object, fact, or condition, his evaluation of that object, fact, or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value, and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from, that object, fact, or condition.

Consequently the view policy-makers, politicians and populations of foreign nations have of a particular state is based on their perceptions and evaluation of that state’s image, as well as the condition, value and meaning they ascribe to that image. For that reason, it can be derived that if a state wanted to increase its soft power, it would have to raise its international prestige by projecting a favourable image of itself to other states.

Images are also connected to roles. Holsti (1967: 172-173) viewed the roles states assume as “orientations towards the outside world”. These could include, among others, roles of mediators, block leaders, carriers of ideology and neutrals. He also argued that the roles states assume create certain obligations and commitments that “policy-makers will usually have to fulfil”. This could create certain “expectations” from other states of what is to be expected of a particular state in particular situations. As a result, expectations from the international community can partly “sustain a state’s international role” (Holsti, 1967: 172).

It was mentioned that state images and roles are connected to foreign policy-making and behaviour. Therefore, a state’s image, or the image it attempts to create, could also be linked to the roles it fulfils. Any particular role that a state fulfils in the international community could be indicative of the particular image it would like to portray to the international community. Then of course, the image it chose to project could also be indicative of the role it fulfils, or would like to fulfil. For instance, a state may often assume a neutral position between conflicting parties and act as mediator, peacekeeper, and promoter of peace and security. The particular state may also promote an image of itself being a moral authority in the international community. Such an image will of course lend credibility to that state’s role as conflict negotiator, mediator and promoter of peace and security. As is discussed in the following chapters, some of the roles South Africa fulfils are that of regional leader, mediator, peacekeeper and intermediary.

‘Image’ in this study, does not only refer to the existing image a state may have in the international community. It essentially points to the image a state would like to have. It is the way it wants to be perceived by other states and it is the way it is actively trying to project or market itself. If this is the case, it is necessary to know who the target market is. For reasons that will become clear later South Africa’s interests in creating a favourable image of itself and boosting its soft power are broadly discussed in terms of positioning itself as a “bridge builder” between North and South.

#### 1.4.4. Global North and Global South

It is noted that the idea of dividing the modern interstate systems into only two classifications is limiting, problematic, and has a serious disregard for various other factors. Buzan & Wæver (2003: 20-26)<sup>3</sup> pointed out the misconceptions when assuming that “the world has evolved into a fairly uniform system of Westphalian-type states differentiated from each other principally by their degree of power, their geographical location, and their cultural background.” But incorporating all factors will lead to unnecessary complication. Therefore, a division into two worlds serves to simplify the study.

A further explanation is that ‘North’ and ‘South’ do not necessarily refer to the geographical locations of the relevant states. It is rather a reflection of the level of economic development and wealth of a nation (Nicola, 2000:11). Alden (1999: 217) said that it has more of a political, economic and ideological meaning. Consequently, the concept indicates the developmental differences between states. Northern states are also associated with the developed world of which the G-8<sup>4</sup> and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries are most relevant. Southern states refer to the developing world and their exclusive organisations such as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). In other words these are states with relatively low economic development compared to Northern states that are largely marginalised in the global economy. In terms of the world systems theory the South forms the periphery, or at best, the semi-periphery.

I would like to point out that the division between North and South also extends to middle powers that are located either in the North or the South. Consequently, Northern middle powers are referred to as ‘traditional middle powers’, while Southern middle powers are known as ‘emerging middle powers’. There are also significant differences in the behavioural characteristics of these two types of middle powers. This is discussed in greater detail in 2.2.2.

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<sup>3</sup> Buzan and Wæver’s discussion is in the context of different state legacies of regional security complexes. It is however considered relevant when trying to illustrate the difficulty in dividing and classifying states into groups. It should therefore support the practice of dividing states into two groups/worlds when dealing with ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.

<sup>4</sup> The G-8 includes the U.S.A., Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, and Russia.



## 1.5. METHODOLOGY

This study is a qualitative assessment which seeks to show how South Africa was actively trying to boost its soft power by making use of the bid to host the Fifa 2010 World Cup as a marketing platform to enhance the country's soft power. The approach will be descriptive, explanatory and evaluatory since the study will apply established theoretical concepts to the arguments. It will also be exploratory because, up to the conclusion of the study, the author did not come across any in-depth scholarly work dealing specifically with South Africa's 2010 World Cup bid.

Data collection pertaining to the case study was predominantly obtained through the media. This includes the print media, such as newspapers, magazines and their Internet equivalents covering the period January 2003 to June 2004. The official websites for the South African Bid Committee, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), International Marketing Council for South Africa (IMC), and Fifa were also incorporated.

The case study presents the opportunity to explore the claims that mega sporting events present opportunities for marketing a country and thereby enhancing its international prestige. This is also directly related to the main question of whether South Africa attempted to enhance its soft power during its 2010 bid. Investigating this question in relation to South Africa necessitates establishing what South Africa's global position, power resources, its dealings with Africa, the South and North and its objectives were. It will be discussed in the context of South Africa's emerging middle power status for which existing academic research and journal literature have been integrated.

To establish if and how South Africa attempted to boost its soft power it is argued that the country projected specific images of itself to the international community. The specific intent of each image was to portray the relevant issues in a favourable light to intended 'audiences'. Therefore this study seeks to elucidate the kinds of images and messages officials have sought to project as manifestations of attempts to expand South Africa's soft



power. The official website for the 2010 Bid is also looked at to establish how the relevant images might have been supported.

## **1.6. LIMITS TO THE RESEARCH**

Although this study incorporates written material on mega-events in general, the analysis is limited to mega-sporting events – specifically South Africa’s bid for the Fifa 2010 World Cup and to a lesser degree, the Fifa 2006 bid. Existing literature provides different motivations for why governments are in favour of bidding and hosting mega-events. Some of these have been named as identity building and signalling, nation building, developmental spin-offs and economic and marketing benefits or opportunities. However, for the most part, the focus falls on the potential marketing and signalling opportunities inherent in the Fifa 2010 bid campaign. This attempts to promote the country’s soft power. Thus, the link between, for instance, economic benefits of mega-events and promoting soft power is not investigated. Therefore, the focus is very specific and pertains essentially to the way in which South Africa sought to project certain favourable images and roles of itself during the 2010 bid, to make both the country in general and the bid specifically, more appealing and attractive to the international community.

The possibility also exists that bidding and hosting mega-events can actually have the opposite effect than intended. For instance, it can reflect negatively on the host or bidding nation. Dimeo & Kay (2004) stated that a mega-event, or the publicity it generates, may spin out of the host nation’s control. Also, anti-state and other social groupings may capitalise a mega-event as their own forum for projecting their message. In terms of the South African bid for 2010, these are mostly not considered.


## **1.7. CHAPTER OUTLINE**

The chapters are structured around the research questions provided in 1.3. Chapter II investigates the middle power concept in relation to South Africa. A distinction is drawn between two groups of middle powers – traditional and emerging. Based on the given criteria a case is then made that South Africa is in fact an emerging middle power. Keeping emerging middle power behaviour and characteristics in mind, South Africa’s position, actions, policies and power are discussed in terms of Africa and the South, as well as the

North. Chapter II will create a context for South Africa's regional, continental and global position and it will be a point of reference for discussing the next chapter. The argument holds that South Africa projected certain favourable images of itself during the 2010 bid. These images are directly related to South Africa's soft power, foreign policy objectives and middle power position.

In Chapter III the attention turns to South Africa's bid for the 2010 World Cup. Thought, before the case study is analysed, soft power and why it is important in relation to Africa, the South, and the North is investigated. It is also argued that South Africa has a serious need to continuously boost its soft power. Here the focus will only fall on bidding and hosting mega-events as a means to enhance soft power. Accordingly, South Africa's history in hosting mega-events is discussed only briefly. The main focus is on the South African bid to host the 2010 World Cup. Here the focus falls on the country's energetic attempt to enhance its soft power by projecting certain chosen images of itself to the rest of the world.

To conclude, Chapter IV provides a summary of the main arguments as well as concluding remarks. Certain aspects worthy of future research – especially in terms of the actual Fifa event in 2010 – are briefly discussed.



## CHAPTER II

### SOUTH AFRICA AS AN EMERGING MIDDLE POWER

*“Since South Africa’s main foreign policy concern is to be part of shaping the global agenda, we would want to become a permanent member of the Security Council”*

Jackie Selebi, former Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (Barber, 2004: 155)

#### 2.1. INTRODUCTION

By 1988 apartheid South Africa was the “most isolated country on the planet” (Vale, 1997: 203). Economic boycotts and sanctions were severe and the diplomatic front looked equally dismal. Pretoria had only a handful of overt bilateral relations and the ability to operate in multilateral frameworks was seriously restricted. In the limited instances where South Africa did have diplomatic manoeuvrability, government officials were preoccupied with defending highly contentious and offensive domestic and foreign policies. Government officials were also defending a state that faced a growing legitimacy crisis in terms of international public opinion. Then, along with the country’s first democratic elections and regime change in 1994, South Africa experienced a phenomenal re-entry to the international arena.


Between 1989 and 1995 the country’s foreign diplomatic missions increased from 30 to 124. By 1999 South Africa was party to 45 international organisations and multilateral treaties (Barber, 2004: 149-151; Nel, Taylor & Van der Westhuizen, 2000). Where governments once went out of their way to shun South Africa from international relations they were now eager to publicly engage<sup>5</sup> with the ‘miracle’ state. What was furthermore striking was the relative swiftness of these changes. South Africa literally went from being the international outcast to the international hero in only a few years.

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<sup>5</sup> It is noted that sanctions and boycotts did not disappear overnight but did take time and negotiation to remove. The fact however remains that public international opinion accepted and approved of the New South Africa (Vale, 1999).

The African National Congress' anti-apartheid struggle was largely based on human rights issues. These issues then also became a central focus of the government's post-apartheid foreign policy and multilateral engagements, although it has been argued in recent years that human rights issues have moved down the government's list of priorities (Black, 2001: 76). However, in contrast to the prior government who had been perceived as an oppressor and human rights abuser by the international community, the new South Africa developed an image as the international protector of human rights. To a large extent this role was self-appointed, but global expectation also pressured South Africa into this role. This expectation was rooted in the idea that because South Africa had struggled against oppression and human rights abuses for decades, the role of universal protector of human rights will be a 'natural' position to take on. Whatever the case, South Africa revealed reformist and activist tendencies in the name of global equality and cooperation.

The important result has been that South Africa's behaviour and role have evolved in such a way that the country now assumes a new position in the international arena. This new role and behaviour is that of a middle power. This point of view is widely conceded by international relations scholars as more literature on the subject becomes readily available (Black, 2001; Cooper, 1997; Nel, Taylor & Van der Westhuizen, 2000; Vale, 1997).



This chapter argues that South Africa is in fact an emerging middle power. This particular brand of middlepowership manifests in the country's policies and actions and is discussed accordingly. South Africa's role and position in Africa, the South and the North is discussed against the backdrop of it being an emerging middle power. It is furthermore argued that the country exhibits reformist agendas in terms of African political and economic environments, as well as the global economic environment. There is however certain limitations and problems associated with reformist agendas. This chapter will add to the background of why soft power is crucial for South Africa's future.

## **2.2. THE MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT**

### **2.2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers**

Middle powers share certain characteristics and behaviours – quantifiable and theoretical. These may be used to suggest whether a state displays a middle power orientation. A basic description of a middle power is a country that stands between the greater and smaller states in the international hierarchical structure. This is however a very vague description. It is the same as describing a semi-periphery as standing between core and periphery countries. For a more precise discussion on middle powers it is necessary to turn to international relations theory that provides two broad traditions for explaining middle powers.

Initially Keohane dealt with the middle power concept during the Cold War era. He stated that “a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution” (Keohane, 1969: 296). However, Keohane (1969) and other authors of that era such as Rothstein and Vital, predominantly viewed the roles and behaviour of middle powers in term of the bipolar international structure of the Cold War. Thereby the concept of middle powers was mostly viewed in terms of global security, as well as the security and survival of the middle power itself. Therefore the focus often fell on middle power “actions taken in balance-of-power situations”. There was also emphasis on middle power fondness for international organisations caused by the “potential security of membership”. In other words, ‘collective security’ was given great attention, such as the capacity of international organisations, like the UN, to “restrain great powers” (Keohane, 1969: 294, 298).

These were of course very relevant during the Cold War. Nevertheless, structural changes such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bi-polar power structure, inevitably caused changes to the nature, behaviour and characteristics of middle powers. Accordingly the second tradition and its global political economy approach of Robert Cox, and also Black (1997) and Cooper (1997), are useful in describing middle powers.

This tradition considers the roles and functions of middle powers beyond the restricting and obsolete Cold War context. This tradition will form the main reference for middle powers in this study. Cox (1996:244) stated that middle powers are likely to be “in the middle rank of material capabilities”. Barber (2004:152) too is of the opinion that there are certain quantifiable characteristics associated with middle powers. He said that middle powers hold positions in the global hierarchy that can usually be determined through measurable assets such as area, population, economy and military capability. He added that a state’s geographical situation will also influence the power that this state wields in its region. It should however be noted that Cox (1996: 524-525) considered the size of a country to play a lesser role when it comes to being a middle power. For Cox the preferred means for identifying a middle power was through its particular role/s in the international system and its multilateral nature. Keohane (1969: 294) too recognised that there are quantifiable assets associated with middle powers but that these are subjective and not precise analytical tools.

Keohane (1969: 298, 303) argued that middle powers acted to protect global security during the Cold War. This would however concede an attempt to restrain great powers. The great powers, however, supply legitimacy to international organisations. Furthermore, international organisations, like the UN, provide the main forums from where middle powers can act. Therefore we can assume that middle powers will also exhibit an amount of restraint in their criticism of the great power.

This view has also been held by Cox but with slightly different reasoning. He made the point that middle powers play a supporting role in the hegemonic order of the day (Cox, 1996: 243). The roles middle powers fulfil contribute to some degree of order and stability in the hegemonic order. The reasoning for this is that regularity and predictability of the international system is directly linked to the interests of middle powers. On the other hand, the interests of the dominant power are usually supported by the rules, practices and ideologies of the hegemonic order. Therefore middle powers have an interest in supporting the hegemonic order of the day.

Part of the reason for this is that, in contrast to hegemons, middle powers lack decisive structural power throughout the political spectrum (Black, 1997; Cooper, 1997). Also, unlike hegemons middle powers do not hold the economic and military backing that are essential for determining (or at least influencing) the desired outcomes in various instances. Despite this, middle powers still have the need for a certain degree of power in various forms to support their policies and sustain their middle power status. Therefore, what middle powers do is to find what Cooper (1997: 6) identifies as their 'niche diplomacy'. Black (1997: 107) called it the "development of sophisticated diplomatic (or persuasive) skills". When referring to the rise to prominence of middle powers, Keohane also mentions the "important diplomatic innovations" middle powers have had. There are numerous different diplomatic skills, innovations and resources that these authors associate with middle powers. All of them include a preference for multilateral cooperation and frameworks. Different middle powers will also make use of different diplomatic skills and resources in different situations. Hence the term 'niche diplomacy'.

Cox (1997: xxvii and 1996:244) viewed the 'middle' in middle power as reference to "working in the middle towards cooperative internationalism" and not as much as a reflection of military and economic capability. Barber (2004: 152) then also said that middle powers tend to follow multilateral solutions to international problems. They prefer negotiation and cooperation in international disputes, and welcome and respect notions of "good international citizenship". Middlepowership is best summed up in the words of Cox (1996: 244):

The ability to take a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change in the world system are the critical elements for fulfilment of the middle power role.

From the above discussion it is clear that because middle powers assume these roles and positions they are often regarded as unselfish, wise, trustworthy and virtuous. They are perceived as the ones that will always take the moral high ground. However, Barber (2004: 244) pointed out that this normative basis for classification attracts serious criticism and

scepticism. It is accurate to say that middle powers contribute to greater international order, stability, predictability and controllability. This is also exactly where their long-term self-interest resides (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167). David Black (1997: 103) has argued:

Middle powers are not simply middle powers because of their participation in mediation, bridge building activity or cooperation in certain technical areas, but because it suits their long term interests *vis-à-vis* world order, the world economy, and the pursuit of dominant societal values and interests, all supported by significant material/technological/bureaucratic capabilities, to do so.

Although the above discussion may have formed a better understanding of middle powers, it still incorporates all middle powers under one banner. It is of course possible to derive certain assumptions on the general behaviour and characteristics of middle powers – as was done in the above discussion. However, there are also important differences between middle powers. With differences I do not imply, for instance, the differences in power, resources and international organisation membership that middle power A holds in relation to middle power B – although these do exist. It is rather a reference to different groups of middle powers and the different characteristics and behaviour they display in relation to each other.



Most of the literature and authors associate middle power behaviour and roles with the global North. This is not surprising since in the past most middle powers were Northern states such as Canada and The Netherlands. Furthermore, besides multilateral behaviour, middle powers were also believed to have power and resources that are more reminiscent of hegemon states than states that are positioned lower down the international hierarchy. Thus, it was mostly Northern states that could measure up to such expectations. However, after the Cold War academics started to recognise that middle powers may also be located in the South, and a distinction was drawn between what is considered a traditional middle power (located in the North) and what is called an emerging middle power (located in the South).

This part of the study deals with South Africa's influence as a middle power and also how it attempts to expand its power in that regard. It is necessary to point out that South Africa is first and foremost part of the global South. Therefore it is also likely that the country is an



emerging middle power. The relevance of this will have to be established because if South Africa is in fact an emerging middle power, it will not suffice to discuss the country according to 'general' or 'traditional' middle power characteristics and behaviour.

The next section will consider the differences between traditional and emerging middle powers. It will serve to create a context for South Africa's particular middlepowership. By being able to identify South Africa's particular brand of middlepowership, it will be possible to reveal how South Africa tries to expand its diplomatic influence.

### **2.2.2 Differences: Traditional vs. Emerging Middle Powers**

It is believed that previous studies have considered middle powers to be located exclusively in the North. Cooper (1997: 14) notes that:

such an exclusionary process leaves out the broader range of states, including not only Australia<sup>6</sup> but India, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Argentina, Turkey and South Africa which have been included in alternative lists of middle powers as divined by their in-between position in the international community.

Because of their more recent appearance they are termed emerging middle powers. Conversely traditional middle powers point to countries situated in the global North (Nel, Taylor & Van Der Westhuizen, 2000). Canada, The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries serve as examples of traditional middle powers. The purpose of this section is to identify the main constitutive and behavioural differences between traditional and emerging middle powers. The aim is to highlight and briefly describe the differences. These differences will feature in a more thorough discussion when applied to the case of South Africa as an emerging middle power in the next section.

From the onset it is obvious that the 'global division' that exists between traditional and emerging middle powers did and will continue to cause differences. For instance, Northern states are economically wealthier, politically more powerful and better represented than


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<sup>6</sup> In this instance Australia is included with Southern middle powers. However, the country is widely considered to be a traditional middle power, as pointed out by Henrikson (1997).

Southern states. The North and South have also had different influences in their political development and history. For instance, some Northern states are former colonisers while certain Southern states have been colonised.

On the other hand, Southern or emerging middle powers often display political and economic power and development that is alien to their immediate region and other states in the South. Barber (2004: 152) points out that a (emerging) middle power can sometimes also be classified according to the power it wields in its geographical region. They are usually much stronger in political and economic terms, as well as in the amount of influence it has in regional organisations. In these instances emerging middle powers display characteristics comparable to Northern states.

The above mentioned influences are only scratching the surface when considering possible reasons for the current state of the international structure and the various roles of different middle powers therein. Of importance is that the above mentioned influences will necessarily cause differences in the behaviour and roles of the two types. An outline of the main constitutive and behavioural differences between traditional and emerging middle powers is shown in Table 1, p 26.



Traditional middle powers are usually core states with stable democracies. They emerged as middle powers during the interwar, Second World War and Cold War years. For instance, Henrikson (1997: 51) discusses Canada's and Australia's development and involvement as middle powers during and after the Second World War. On the other hand, emerging middle powers are usually semi-peripheries whose middle power identity appeared after the Cold War. They are also young democracies with some undemocratic features (Jordaan, 2003: 171-173). Undemocratic features for instance, manifest as significant human rights abuses and one-party dominant political systems, as is the case with Malaysia. Also, unlike their Northern counterparts, emerging middle powers like Brazil have a highly unequal distribution of domestic wealth.

**Table 1. Differences between Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers.**

	<b>Traditional Middle Powers</b>	<b>Emerging Middle Powers</b>
<b>Constitutive Differences</b>		
<b>Democratic Tradition</b>	Stable social democracies	Relatively unstable, recently democratised with some very undemocratic aspects
<b>Time of Emergence as Middle Power</b>	During the Cold War	After the Cold War
<b>Position in World Economy</b>	Core	Semi-periphery
<b>Domestic Distribution of Wealth</b>	Very equal	Highly unequal
<b>Regional Influences</b>	Low	High
<b>Origin of Perceived Neutrality</b>	Regional ambivalence and relative unimportance	Regional self-association and significance
<b>Behavioural Differences</b>		
<b>Regional Orientation</b>	Fairly low	Moderately high
<b>Attitude to Regional Integration and Cooperation</b>	Ambivalent	Eager (often assuming leadership role)
<b>Nature of Actions to Effect Global Change</b>	Appeasing and legitimising	Reformist and legitimising
<b>Purpose of International Identity Construction</b>	Distance from powerful in the region	Distance from weak in the region

**Source:** Jordaan (2003: 168)

Another important difference is that contrary to traditional middle powers, emerging middle powers are stronger than the states in their immediate region. Compare for instance the neighbours of The Netherlands (representing a traditional middle power in Western Europe) with those of Brazil (as an emerging middle power in South America). Emerging middle powers are also more involved in regional cooperation and often take the lead in regional structures and organisations. Traditional middle powers are rather ambivalent towards the same issues in their immediate regions. This often happens as a result of the power differential between them and their powerful neighbours.

As far as middle powers aim at affecting global change, both traditional and emerging middle powers are described as legitimising since they look at ways in which global threats could be contained (Jordaan, 2003:173-178). This reinforces what was mentioned earlier, namely, that middle powers play a supporting role in the hegemonic order of the day (Cox, 1996: 243). However, traditional middle powers tend to be appeasing, while emerging middle powers display reformist tendencies. The motivation for this resides in the fact that emerging middle powers stand to benefit from reforms in the global economy. These emerging middle powers are however very reserved with the criticism they direct against the major powers of the day, since they also stand to lose a lot, as will become clearer later. Having delineated the criteria associated with emerging middle powers, these can now be applied to South Africa.

### **2.3. SOUTH AFRICA AS AN EMERGING MIDDLE POWER**

Criteria from the previous section seem to support the argument for South Africa's emerging middlepowership. South Africa only became a democracy in 1994 and is still battling with transformational difficulties. There are for instance, tensions between economic reforms such as privatisation on the one hand, and alleviating poverty and job creation on the other. The country's growing internationalism and multilateralism only took root after the end of the Cold War and apartheid. Furthermore, the country is a semi-periphery in the world economy and is known for its highly unequal domestic distribution of wealth. South Africa's Human Development Index ranking is 119 and it has a Gini Index of 59.3 (UNDP, 2003). Inequality over the distribution of income and consumption in South Africa is thus extremely high.

But it is in the behavioural characteristics where the real importance of South Africa's emerging middlepowership lies. These include the country's regional influence and orientation, attitude to regional integration and cooperation, nature of actions to effect global change and the purpose of international identity construction. It is also evident in the behavioural characteristics where South Africa's (and other emerging middle powers') 'in-between' position in the international hierarchy comes into play.

The above-mentioned will be discussed under two broad headings. The first is South Africa's Regional, African and Southern context. The second is South Africa's Global Context and Relationship with the North. The reason why the focus mainly falls on these two areas is credited to South Africa's self-appointed (and often perceived as 'natural') role as a go-between and bridge builder. As will become clear, these roles are central to South Africa's foreign policy and long term interests. It also fits perfectly in the domain of a middle power.

Some local and international actors also consider South Africa as a 'natural' link or bridge between the North and South. This notion is based on some of the country's characteristics. For instance, South Africa's economic structure has First and Third World sections; it has interests in both worlds; and its geographical position spans from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean (Bischoff, 2003; Saul, 2004: 78; Barber, 2004: 158). The argument goes that these unique features enable South Africa to understand the position, needs and demands of both worlds and so convey it to both as well. For instance, South Africa carries the South's plight and need for debt relief to their Northern creditors. South Africa may convey the North's expectations for peace, security and democracy in the South, to the South.

The focus on the two areas is not only because of South Africa's role as go-between and bridge builder. South Africa has its own long-term interests at heart. And, as will be discussed, these interests also reside in South Africa's capacity to interrelate between North and South.

### **2.3.1 South Africa's Regional, African and Southern Context**

Saul (2004: 78) points out that South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) government came to power "with the strongest of Third World credentials". They have also built on their struggle credentials to "present themselves, both domestically and internationally, as key representatives, interpreters and defenders of the countries of the Southern poor". Such a high profile moral position fits neatly in the emerging middle power grouping. But being the 'champion of the South' is crucial for South Africa's future as well since it can provide the country with invaluable support from Southern countries.

Other African states and specifically those in South Africa's immediate region are of great importance. To a large degree South Africa's future goals and successes are and will be directly influenced by the political and economic condition of its region and the continent. A leading reason for this is that Africa now represents one of South Africa's single largest export markets (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 6, 12). As an African and regional hegemon it is in South Africa's own, as well as in the collective African interest to present the case on behalf of Africa to the North.

A few quantifiable assets place South Africa comfortably in the emerging middle power category. The country wields considerable power (both relational and structural) *vis-à-vis* other African states. It is also obvious why South Africa enjoys descriptions such as the 'African giant' and 'African power'. In terms of infrastructure, transportation, telecommunication, electricity generation, and trade the country is unequalled by any other in Africa (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 13-20). In fact, most Southern African states are dependent on South Africa's transport infrastructure and a regular supply of electricity for their industries and trade.

South Africa has a population of 43.6 million (World Bank, 2003). The combined population of the 11 countries which make up the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is 190 million (Ramsamy, 2003). Thus, South Africa's population represents nearly a fifth of the region's total population. The South African economy is 3.4 times larger than the combined economies of the other SADC countries (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 20). Furthermore, South Africa produces 44% of the total GDP (1995) for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). More recently South Africa accounted for 75% of SADC's US\$ 127 billion market (Martin, 2002:163). By 1997 the number of South African military personnel was only second to Angola (110 000 to 90 000), with the next largest being the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with 40 000 personnel (Barber, 2004: 183).

But South Africa's emerging middlepowership is not supported by quantifiable assets alone. As Cox noted, middle power identification is most evident or relevant in the particular role(s) and multilateral nature of the state in question. Emerging middle power behaviour and

characteristics then also manifest most visibly in South Africa's actions, policies and involvement in Africa.

As is the case with emerging middle powers, South Africa is highly involved in its regional and continental environment. Regional integration and cooperation features high on the South African agenda and the country often assumes leadership positions in regional and African organisations and initiatives. The rationale for this kind of behaviour and high level of involvement is partly because of the fact that South Africa is in a completely different class when compared to its immediate neighbours and other African peers. It is much more resourceful and outweighs the others economically and politically and therefore also has a large amount of control over the relevant initiatives and regional organisations. An example here would be South Africa's strong position in SADC, Southern African Customs Union, and the African Union. This stands in contrast to traditional middle powers that usually have less or equal power in relation to others in their region. Since traditional middle powers have less power in their regions they will also have less influence and control over regional projects. As a result they will rather steer clear of regional projects (Jordaan, 2003: 177).

South Africa's eager involvement in all aspects concerning multilateralism is probably the most obvious example of its emerging middle power aspirations. South Africa's multilateral foreign policy approach towards Africa and its power and position on the continent are of course closely related. During the late 1990s South Africa's position and leadership in the rebuilding of Africa became very prominent under President Thabo Mbeki and his ideas for the 'African Renaissance' (Nicola, 2001:19, 20). Special emphasis was placed on good political and economic governance while older and obsolete African organisations and initiatives had to make way for new ones. What is of importance is that it became noticeable that South Africa regarded multilateralism as central to all aspects concerning Africa's development. In reference to South Africa's foreign policy Bischoff (2003: 184) states:

It has contributed to issues such as international multilateral regimes on a global trading system, debt relief for poor countries, nuclear non-proliferation and the constitution of an International Criminal Court. The idea of a reformed SADC, the call for an 'African



Renaissance' or the plan for a New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) within the context of an African Union, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity, have been the most recent part of this pluralist–multilateralist impulse.

The African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), Pan African Parliament (PAP), African Peace and Security Council (APSC) and SADC are the more important examples of South Africa's multilateral involvement in (and as a driver behind) regional cooperation, integration and leadership aspirations that are aimed at transforming the African environment. These are then also criteria by which South Africa can be classified as an emerging middle power.

As far as South Africa's immediate region is concerned, its leadership in SADC featured quite prominently after 1994. Some hold the view that South Africa is the only country on the continent with enough leverage to negotiate fairly favourable trade agreements for SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)<sup>7</sup>. In 1996 President Mandela then also became the organisation's chairperson (Barber, 2004: 188). Ironically, SADC was founded in 1980 with the intended purpose to make the Southern African region less dependent on South Africa. It was then known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). After Mandela became chairperson of SADC, South Africa's active involvement was aimed at making the organisation more effective and efficient while creating better consensus and cooperation.

However, the AU and its relevant organs and initiatives started to overshadow the other African organisations – at least from the South African perspective. South Africa is deeply committed to the AU, since the organisation is a primary platform from which South Africa's plans and ideals for Africa are executed. Its importance is evident from the fact that a large part of the AU's budget is financed by South Africa. On top of that South Africa pays a premium subscription fee to the AU and it is argued that these actions are intended to ensure that the AU keeps afloat (*Mail & Guardian*, 3/10/2003). The AU is furthermore important to

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<sup>7</sup> It is noted that this is a very controversial issue with contesting viewpoints. I am therefore not attempting to argue that it is indeed what is happening. Rather it just serves as support that South Africa's position in Africa is head and shoulders above the rest.



South Africa because the Pan African Parliament, Nepad or the African Renaissance in general, all falls within the contexts of the AU. The AU was also intended to replace the terribly ineffective OAU. In addition South Africa played host to the opening and the first AU summit that was held in Durban, 2002.

As far as Nepad is concerned Thabo Mbeki is considered to be the pilot of this initiative. Nepad is widely considered as the main developmental program for Africa. Ultimately Nepad is based on a trade-off where Africa will receive the much needed foreign investment from Northern states<sup>8</sup> (mainly the G-8) in exchange for good political and economic governance (Breytenbach, 2002). Good political and economic governance is supposed to be reviewed by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that is directly related to the Nepad initiative (Cilliers, 2002). There are also the African Peace and Security Council (APSC) intended to ensure good political and economic governance. The APSC falls under the AU too.

The APSC is supposed to be critical towards, and intervene in countries that do not comply with the ideas in the new development programmes for Africa. Once again South Africa occupies a high-power position within the institution. The country recently secured one of the upper-tier seats<sup>9</sup> on the APSC (Cornish, 2004a: 16). A stronger position here will ensure that South Africa has more control over the regional and African projects – as is typically expected of emerging middle powers.

Another creation of the AU is the Pan African Parliament (PAP) of which South Africa recently became the seat. Before South Africa was awarded the seat it became very clear that this goal featured very high on the government's agenda. The media even referred to it as "the second South African priority at the AU" (the first priority was to obtain the upper-tier seat at the APSC) (Cornish, 2004a: 16). A central focus of South Africa's intentions with the AU, APSC and PAP has been to bring an end to Africa's many devastating conflicts.

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<sup>8</sup> Here too I am not judging the validity of this claim, but am only pointing out what was believed will happen, or was promised will happen.

<sup>9</sup> There are 5 upper-tier seats and 10 lower ranked seats.

Conflict resolution was also linked to South Africa's foreign policy on the continent and formed part of the wider 'African renaissance' idea (Malan, 1999).

Peacefully preventing and ending conflict and also creating lasting peace on the African continent are essential parts of South Africa's renaissance plans for Africa. This is evident in the country's involvement in creating and piloting organs such as the APSC. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo stated during a speech in 1995:

We (South Africa) have a limited capacity, but will, as far as possible, assist in efforts aimed at the furtherance world-wide of peace and democracy; human rights; sustainable development; protection of the environment; and disarmament (cited in Shaw & Cilliers, 1996).

He also stated in the same speech that Africa was a "priority in the years ahead". This became evident through South Africa's involvement in peacekeeping operations as well as the facilitation and mediation in peace negotiations on the continent. Furthermore, South Africa has sent numerous peacekeeping forces or peace delegations to various conflict areas on the continent including Burundi, Rwanda, Eritrea/Ethiopia and more recently, in the Sudan (Crisisweb, 2004; Barber, 2004: 172-173). The country also often acts as the facilitator and mediator for peace negotiations (Bischoff, 2003:184).

South Africa's drive to create peace on the continent is furthermore reflected in its financial contributions made towards such efforts. The country's financial contribution to UN peace supporting operations is twice that of Nigeria and five times that of Egypt (Shaw & Cilliers, 1996; Land, 1996). Furthermore, South Africa also provided financing for AU peace-making and keeping on the African continent (*Mail & Guardian*, 3/10/2003). But the country's role as mediator between conflicting parties has not been limited to the African continent. The country has also been involved in peace efforts in Northern Ireland and the Middle East.

Indeed, South Africa's prominent position and leadership aspiration in African organisations are not restricted to the African continent. The country's involvement, influence and leadership aspirations stretch beyond Africa to include the global South as well. For

instance, South Africa chaired the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) from 1998 to 2001 and is also an important and influential member of the G-20+, a South-South dialogue forum. (Barber, 2004: 155-157; Bond, 2004: 63-65, 77). The G-20+ then also had what some considered a breakthrough in South-South cooperation in global trade reform<sup>10</sup>. For instance, Mbeki (2003) noted after the failed WTO meeting in Cancun:

Our need and ability to work together was also demonstrated during the recent WTO negotiations at Cancun, Mexico. In this instance, India, Brazil, China, South Africa, Nigeria, Argentina, Indonesia and other countries came together in the so-called G20+ to advance the interests of the developing countries as a whole. This cooperation will continue.

In addition South Africa has become involved in what can be described as emerging middle power alliances. A prime example is the trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum that was launched in June 2003. The alliance was initiated by South Africa and is considered to have a significant political influence in the multilateral arena (White, 2004: 1-4). IBSA aims to create greater South-South cooperation that will lead to better political and economic leverage for the South. This leverage, it is argued, can be used to initiate global trade reforms, especially in terms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

It is therefore apparent that such forums may serve South African attempts to influence global change. This feature is indicative of an emerging middle power. In addition, the South African government is also keen on the idea that the country should have a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC) (Barber, 2004: 155). Thereby South Africa will be able to represent the developing world in the UNSC. The UNSC reform issue also features in IBSA dialogue. This comes as no surprise since all three countries desire a permanent seat in the UNSC. Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim even went as far as to say that the IBSA states are 'natural candidates' for permanent seats (Gruzd, 2004).

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
<sup>10</sup> However, it must be noted that the stability of the alliance is very uncertain, as evidenced by the fact that a number of G20+ 'member' countries have been lured away from the grouping through bilateral FTA's and trade agreements with the US (Gruzd, 2004).

Thus, South Africa is a serious player in Africa and in the South. The country also displays reformist tendencies. However, it is one thing to act among the South and quite another to act amongst the Northern states. This will become apparent in the next section.

### **2.3.2 South Africa's Global Context and Relationship with the North**

This discussion on post-apartheid South Africa's relationship with the North revolves broadly around two aspects. In the first instance, the ANC government realised the unquestionable importance the North has in South Africa's short and long-term interests. In other words, Northern support is crucial for South Africa's emerging middle power role. Second, the North recognised the importance and potential benefits of having good relations with a Southern emerging middle power like South Africa. As stated, emerging middle powers has a legitimising factor as far as the global hegemonic order is concerned.

As is the case with South African's regional and African context, its unique position as a link between the developed and developing worlds is very relevant in the country's relationship with the North. In fact, South Africa's relationship, role, interests and leadership in and with the South could be directly jeopardised by its relationship with the North, as well as the amount of support it receives from the North. This is where the North's importance to South Africa becomes apparent in a number of areas.



First, South Africa's new governing order quickly realised the importance of the North to its own interests, as well as its regional and global position. Former ANC Secretary General, Alfred Nzo mentioned in 1996 the "realities we dare not ignore" in reference to the US and G-7 as "the power bases of the world today, and essential to our economic well being" (Barber, 2004: 98). Some of South Africa's leading economic partners are located in the North, especially in terms of the European Union (EU) and the U.S. In 1995 the four leading export markets for South Africa in terms of individual states were all located in the developed world, specifically the U.K., U.S., Japan and Germany (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 7; Barber, 2004: 163). As such, South Africa had to adapt to global standards and practices such as promoting neo-liberal economic policies. Spence (2001: 4-5) states that:

A major preoccupation of the Mandela administration's foreign policy has been to weld South Africa's economy into a global market place which rewards liberalisation and deregulation and penalises rigidity, inflexibility in the labour market and continued state control over particular assets.

And, in order to draw much needed FDI South Africa realised it was necessary for "the creation of an enabling environment compromised of good governance and economic performance in line with the so called Washington Consensus". In doing so South Africa followed all sorts of neo-liberal economic policies and reforms, such as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programmes, to bring its domestic economy in line with the global norm. Williams & Taylor (2000) showed how the ANC government moved away from its more social democratic policies to institute neo-liberal economic policies and reforms. But South Africa also promoted neo-liberal policies in the rest of Africa as a means to achieve good economic governance, as Nepad is clearly an example of example. This is where the second point of Northern importance comes in; that is to say that Northern approval and support for South Africa's emerging middle power position could reinforce the country's legitimacy and authority in Africa and the South.

As mentioned, South Africa's role as go-between has been Africa's connection with the North and has represented them there on issues such as aid, FDI and debt. In turn, South Africa conveys the wishes and position of the North to the South. This is not where it stops. South Africa is actively promoting the same economic policies, reforms and standards<sup>11</sup> that it has implemented domestically, to the rest of Africa and the South. In terms of Africa it has been clearly reflected through South African initiatives such as Nepad. As far as the South is concerned, in 1997 South Africa invited Northern representatives to attend NAM meetings (Barber, 2004: 160). This invitation, the first of its kind, was extended to the US, UK, France and the EU. If the North does deliver on their promises and 'reward' political and economic reform in Africa, South Africa's position as regional leader should be strengthened. My argument is that South Africa, as the promoter of the economic and political reforms (i.e. Nepad, APSC etc.), should receive greater cooperation from African

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<sup>11</sup> Such as the Washington consensus and other neo-liberal policies

countries if they (African countries) are rewarded for their reforms. Of course the opposite is also likely and South Africa can lose a lot of its credibility as a leader and emerging middle power. Also, the amount of Northern support (financial and other) that Africa receives will influence South Africa's regional integration and the degree to which it enjoys regional cooperation.

The above-mentioned is thus directly linked to the third important point. The North is expected to be the main source of financing for South Africa's grand, turnaround schemes for Africa. According to Bischoff (2003: 188) South Africa wants to change the "African policy environment in favour of the creation of conditions for wealth and security". This is to be done partly by making use of aid from the Western donor community.

For instance, in the case of Nepad the G-8 countries made investment 'promises' to Africa. Initially Nepad was based on the idea that Africa would receive US\$ 64 billion annually from the G-8 states and it was furthermore aimed to achieve and sustain an average annual GDP growth rate of 7% for the next 15 years – pertaining to all participating African countries (Breytenbach, 2002; Dahl, 2003). However, in July 2002 the G-8 only pledged \$6 billion a year (Matlosa, 2002: 8). This also brings in doubt if the targeted 7% growth-rate is obtainable since it was projected on a US\$ 64 million inflow. Nevertheless, the point is South Africa desperately needs Northern support for its leadership position and initiatives in Africa.

The importance of Northern support also extends to South Africa's other emerging middle power initiatives, specifically South Africa's global economic reformist initiatives or rhetoric. There is also the matter of South Africa's global leadership aspirations, especially in terms of international institutions – for instance, the desire for permanent UN Security Council membership. Since the most powerful members in the UN are mostly Northern states, and if there ever is UN reform, Northern support will be decisive if South Africa is ever to have a permanent seat.

Despite this, South Africa has to a large extent enjoyed preferential treatment from Northern states. When compared to other African and developing states in general, South Africa is one of the few that receive Northern favouritism. The favouritism evident in the fact that post-1994 South Africa found itself included in a growing number of highly favoured places and situations, as well as in the company of powerful and elite people groups and organisations.

For instance, Nelson Mandela attended the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland in 1999 (Barber, 2004: 161). Thabo Mbeki is also no stranger to Davos. This forum is then also predominantly attended by only the richest governments and companies. In addition, South Africa became a regular attendee at World Bank, IMF and G-8 meetings. For example, the country attended the G-8 summits in Kananaskis, Canada (2002) and in Evian (2003) (Bond, 2004: 9-10, 51).

South Africa being favoured by the North and its institutions did not go unnoticed in the South and a great deal of criticism has been directed against the actions and policies of the South African government. Areas that particularly drew the attention of critics are those that are perceived as the government's double standards in terms of dealing with the North and representing the South. For instance, the government is accused of "talking left" but in actual fact is "walking right" (Bond, 2004; Saul, 2004). Also, the question has been asked with whom the government is actually siding, North or South? And, to what extent is South Africa committed to its African obligations and promises?

Instead of being regarded as the 'champion of Africa', South Africa is accused of acting in its own interests at the expense of Africa and it is no mystery why. At the WTO, South Africa was allowed to attend the highly controversial and exclusive 'Green Room Meeting' in 1999. It is interesting to note that the only other Southern state present at that meeting was fellow IBSA member and emerging middle power, India. This could be further verification for the idea that the North are searching for Southern states, or emerging middle powers that can add to legitimising the global *status quo*. Furthermore, former South African Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin accepted the equally controversial 'Friend of the Chair' position at



the WTO in 2001. The Friend of the Chair position allows the holder to negotiate WTO rules (Bond, 2004: 52).

While the level of inclusion has been testimony to the North's acknowledgement and approval of South Africa's emerging middle power status, it is necessary to ask why Pretoria receives such approval. What makes South Africa special to the North?

South Africa's peaceful transition to democracy and the consolidation thereof, as well as the country's relative economic success (compared to its African peers) all play a part. Bischoff (2003: 185) says that South Africa's progressive constitution, stable government and open democracy have left a favourable impression on the Northern states. Moreover, South Africa is a "magnet for those Western states that look towards relations with a reliably democratising South". In 1994 the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa said that "there is inspiration and hope in the pragmatic miracle of South Africa's negotiated transition to democracy" (Martin, 2002: 250). Thus, there are those that view the country as the last hope for the poverty stricken and war ridden continent. Some also view South Africa as an example for other African states. This is evident in a statement by US President Bush in 2003: "I look forward to going to South Africa, where I'll meet with elected leaders who are firmly committed to economic reforms in a nation that has become a major force for regional peace and stability" (Bond, 2004: 30).

Barber (2004: 150) notes that South Africa is "committed to Western-inspired values of democracy and good governance". Thus, in South Africa the North has found an ally in the South to promote pro-Northern ideals to the South. Additionally, the global order (or what Cox (1996: 243) referred to as the hegemonic order) is of such a nature that it predominantly serves the interests of the North. It is then here where South Africa's importance to the North is highlighted, while another emerging middle power characteristic is also displayed. By promoting and representing Northern ideals in the developing world, South Africa is legitimising the global *status quo*. In the specific case of emerging middle powers the following is said:



They are legitimisers, because given their privileged positions in the global political economy and regional political economies they benefit relatively from the institutionalisation of (the inequality associated with) the current neo-liberal hegemony. But, true to their conflict-management proclivities, middle powers assist in making the ideology, values and practices of the hegemonic order that facilitate and mask global inequality appear more natural and universal (Jordaan, 2003: 169).

So, it is clear that this is precisely the situation with South Africa. As mentioned the country has been seen as the economic hope for Africa. Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan (1998: 30-31) argued that “there is increasing evidence that the United States, the other G-7 nations, the European Union and the Bretton Woods institutions see South Africa’s private sector as the saviour of Africa”. There are however other economic aspects where South Africa can also play a useful role towards helping Northern powers. These aspects are of greater concern to Northern self-interest. South Africa’s influences (especially in economic terms) in Southern Africa have been discussed. Combining this with South Africa’s role as mediator between North and South, it makes the country the ideal point of entry to Southern African markets. Martin (2002: 87) then also states that France has viewed South Africa as the ideal “intermediary and power broker” for Southern African market penetration. Northern economic interests may also be extended to Africa’s conflicts.

The UN and donor nations (predominantly Northern states) are keen to devolve peacekeeping responsibilities to African states (Bischoff, 2004: 192). In other words, it lessens their responsibilities. Northern institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO recognised the role that South Africa can play in conflict resolution on the continent. They also support South Africa in its peacekeeping operations in Africa (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998: 30). South Africa’s involvement and efforts to conflict resolution by means of peacekeeping operations, as well as facilitating peace negotiations and mediation have been discussed (*Mail & Guardian*, 03/10/2003). There are also the South African driven organs such as the African Peace and Security Council that are supposed to resolve and prevent conflicts on the continent. Thus, South Africa presents the North with an opportunity to decrease their peacekeeping activities and responsibilities on the continent.

It is therefore clear that South Africa's emerging middle power position is widely accepted and supported by the developed world. It has placed the country in the position to pursue global reformist agendas through forums such as IBSA, UNCTAD, WTO, ECOSOC, and the G20+. Conversely, it was also stated that South Africa cannot display and voice complete disregard for orthodox and mostly Northern global economic and political practices and standards. Otherwise they may risk a Northern backlash.

## **2.4. CONCLUSION**

The aim of this chapter was to show how South Africa's particular kind of middle power manifests in the country's policies and actions. Through the application of the appropriate criteria it was shown that the country conforms to the behavioural characteristics of an emerging middle power. This is evident from South Africa's policies, actions and other features associated with South Africa's unique position between the global North and global South.

Being an emerging middle power necessarily means that South Africa holds a particular significance for its immediate region and continent, but also for the international system. Furthermore, it should be considered that this 'particular significance' means that South Africa also holds a certain influence and authority in relation to its region, continent and the international system. Therefore, the combination of factors that contributed to the country's emerging middle power status is also the source of the different types of power South Africa has in relation to other states. Under power we can of course include the structural and hard relational power South Africa holds over some Southern states, especially states in its immediate region. But there is also symbolic or soft power, as it was defined in Chapter I. South Africa's soft power and its resources are then also the main concern of this study. It is believed that South Africa has a considerable amount of soft power that supports its initiatives, position and leadership aspirations. Thus, as discussed in the following chapter, South Africa's soft power and emerging middlepowership are inseparable.

This chapter mentioned how the promotion and protection of human rights were central to the apartheid struggle. Then there was the relatively peaceful, negotiated transformation to

democracy. Following on this was the internationally expected, but also self-assumed role as protector of international human rights. This spilled over into South Africa trying its hand at addressing global economic injustice, thereby displaying reformist leanings and acquiring the title of 'champion for the South'. Furthermore, South Africa offered or was approached to act as conflict negotiation mediator, facilitator and peacekeeper in various conflict situations on the continent and elsewhere.

These all contributed to enhancing South Africa's global image and moral authority. It had the effect that the country received a lot of voluntary cooperation and acceptance of its authority regarding certain aspects. In other words, the above-mentioned factors enhanced South Africa's soft power.

In addition, the Northern states were attracted by South Africa's democratic transformation and the acceptance and implementation of what is considered Northern or Western neo-liberal policies and ideals. The country was also seen as an example for other Southern states. It could prove that Northern ideals and policies can work in the South if implemented correctly. South Africa also has the potential to legitimise the global *status quo* that is mainly based on Northern values and ideals. Also, Northern states have a mostly negative image in the South and elsewhere. For instance, they are perceived as imperialistic and oppressive. Being seen on friendly terms with a state that carries great global moral authority and acts and claims to be the champion of the South cannot hurt. For these reasons South Africa received the North's support and acceptance.

Thus, although South Africa has no structural and hard power over the Northern states, it has a considerable amount of soft power to wield. Soft power is therefore of great importance in South Africa's dealings with countries from the North and the South. South Africa then also has an interest to sustain and to further develop its soft power.

However, there are also serious cracks forming in South Africa's moral authority, leadership and soft power, especially in regards to how it is perceived by African and Southern states. So, South Africa is faced with the problem of how to enhance its soft power. This question

forms the focus of the next chapter. The importance of soft power for South Africa, as well as the potential ways for enhancing its soft power is discussed in relation to the country's bid to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup.



## CHAPTER III

### THE 2010 BID AS A MEANS TO INCREASE SOFT POWER

*“I am also privileged to convey to you our deep felt gratitude for giving the peoples of Africa the possibility to host the Soccer World Cup. The historic decision you took has made the unequivocal statement that you, the leaders of world soccer, are firmly of the view that Africa's time has come!”*

*“We have come to Zurich together to convey the seriousness with which we take your decision that Africa should host the 2010 Soccer World Cup. In front of you, we reiterate our commitment to ensure that indeed all Africa shares a common sense of participation in a World Cup hosted by Africa. With all due humility, we undertake that as hosts of the Soccer World Cup, we would ensure that our continent shares a common sense of empowering achievement at what we would do to ensure that we sustain the pride of Fifa”*

Thabo Mbeki, 2004.

#### 3.1. INTRODUCTION

The central focus of this chapter deals with South Africa's bid for the 2010 Fifa World Cup. The aim of this case study is to show how South Africa used its Fifa bid in an attempt to enhance its soft power. It will be argued that South Africa has projected certain chosen images of itself with the intention of showcasing the country on a global scale. As a result, the South African approach to this challenge will also be discussed. The objective is not to qualify whether these attempts have been successful in boosting South Africa's soft power. The aim is rather to establish if South Africa did attempt to boost its soft power.


The first part of the discussion will show how South Africa has been boosting, or rather has been attempting to increase its symbolic/soft power since the early 1990s. The idea is to create a better understanding of why it is believed that bidding and hosting Fifa 2010 is another means in South Africa's search for greater soft power. I will then create a context where it will be illustrated why soft power is important to South Africa. The preceding chapter did touch on these aspects but here it will be examined in greater detail. A better background on the importance of soft power for South Africa will support the reasoning behind the country's attempt to portray itself in certain ways that will enhance its soft power. The attention will then turn to the Fifa 2010 World Cup bid campaign.

## **3.2. SOUTH AFRICA, MEGA-EVENTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SOFT POWER**

Chapter I identified the potential gains governments attach to bidding and hosting mega-events. International relations scholars argue that the gains include identity building and signalling, marketing, developmental benefits, and promoting democracy and human rights. They also believe that more and more developing states are buying into these ideas (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelissen, 2004a). South Africa is one example where this view holds true. But before this is discussed it is necessary to again point out that this study is mainly concerned with the potential marketing benefits of mega-events. Accordingly it is where the focus will remain.

### **3.2.1 The Importance of Soft Power for South Africa**

It has been established that South Africa is an emerging middle power. As such, the country has various regional and global aspirations, initiatives, and goals that it would like to achieve and has to support. These are of course all tied to its own long-term self-interests. The question is then how South Africa, with limited hard power and resources to rely on, will achieve its objectives and strengthen its own global position? Here I would like to argue that South Africa, as is the case with other middle powers, has to rely on soft power to a large extent.



The motivation for this is that although middle powers lack the power and resources of major powers<sup>12</sup>, they still possess limited influence over global issues. The source for this influence partly resides in soft power. Soft power is viewed as a non-coercive means to either establish voluntary cooperation, or to achieve own or collective gain. This is done by means of attractive and legitimate authority and power, as well as other intangible aspects such as culture, ideology, institutions and foreign policy (section 1.4.1.). If we for instance consider emerging middle powers with their tendency to display a reformist agenda, it becomes apparent how important it is to enjoy voluntary international cooperation, respect and prestige. And this is largely achieved through soft power.

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<sup>12</sup> In Chapter II it was stated that, in contrast to hegemons, middle powers lack decisive structural power throughout the political spectrum (Black, 1997: 107; Cooper, 1997: 6). Also, unlike hegemons they do not hold the economic and military backing that is essential for determining (or at least influencing) the desired outcomes in various instances.

Chapter II showed that South Africa has reformist agendas in terms of changing the nature of political and economic governance in Africa. To an extent South Africa is also addressing global economic reforms. Accordingly, South Africa has to deal with both the North and South. But when compared to the Northern states, South Africa is outdone in terms of structural power and military and economic capability. As a result, the potential influence of soft power becomes more important. When compared to Africa and others in the developing world, South Africa has relatively strong relational power. This does not mean that its soft power is less needed in dealing with Africa.

In Africa the success rate of South African initiatives such as Nepad and its leadership role will definitely be influenced by how legitimate and attractive its power, authority, culture and ideology is viewed by other African states. South Africa may be a giant compared to the others in the region and the continent but it is still only an emerging middle power. Ultimately it cannot force others to comply. It then becomes clear that South Africa has to rely to a large degree on the voluntary cooperation of other African states. In other words, African nations must want what South Africa wants. To achieve this South African authority and leadership must be perceived as legitimate and committed to Africa. It is here where potential 'cracks' can form in terms of how Africa perceives South Africa's moral authority and leadership. As put by Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan (1998), is South Africa a partner of Africa or just another self-interested hegemon? To increase its stature South Africa has to rely on its soft power.

As far as its soft power in Africa is concerned, it has been noted that there may be a growing resentment against South Africa (Bischoff, 2003: 191, 196). The reasons for the resentment are numerous and range from suspicion and fear of South Africa's economic and political power to its relationship with the North.

The great concern should be that it is South Africa's power that is perceived to be a threat. It is stated that the other SADC countries fear South Africa's political and economic 'giantism' (*Mail & Guardian*, 22/08/2003). South Africa's commitment and its pledge to develop Africa, and other associated promises and initiatives, are often questioned by African states.

Martin (2002: 40) said that South Africa's unilateral trade negotiations (for example with the EU) lead other SADC members to question the concept of "SADC first". Gruzd (2004) stated that South Africa's involvement in IBSA and consequently, the time and effort it spent on Brazil and India instead of Africa are points of controversy for African states.

Another great problem is that South Africa's 'African identity' comes into question. As can be expected, the fact that South Africa is the initiator of the IBSA forum only added to these suspicions. Then there is the preferential treatment South Africa enjoys from the North. The effect this has had is that South Africa has been accused of having double standards. The situation becomes problematic for South Africa when the above mentioned is combined with the country's significant trade, economic and political power in Africa, as well as its implementation and promotion of neo-liberal economic policies and mostly Western orientated political institutions. The result is that the country is rather perceived as 'the North' among 'the South' than a fellow Southern ally (McGowan & Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998: 169-170).

In Africa, South Africa may still be able to incorporate limited hard economic and military power resources to get others to comply. These resources are basically non-existent when dealing with the North. It is here too that soft power comes into play – especially in the way South Africa is observed by Northern states and institutions. Therefore, by boosting its image in certain ways, South Africa can enhance its global appeal.

As cited, part of South Africa's attraction to the North is in the way it stands out from the rest of Africa and others in the South. Here, I refer to its relatively successful economic conditions, peaceful democratic political environment and economic policy transformation. To a degree South Africa is also seen as an ally in the South. South Africa thus has an interest in maintaining such an image in the North.

If not, South Africa will lose Northern interest and support and won't be able (or allowed to, for that matter) to participate in and on the level it does in the various Northern dominated organisations. South Africa's credibility as intermediary between the North and South may



suffer. South Africa also needs credible and legitimate authority in the eyes of the North to pursue global economic reforms. Otherwise South Africa may experience a Northern backlash if the North deems South African lead reforms as illegitimate or threatening to their interests. The situation is further complicated by certain global developments. Bischoff (2003: 186) notes:

However, the current international system is characterised by lurches towards American-led unilateralism and the diminution of multilateralism. This weakening of multilateralism reduces South Africa's potential for playing the role of facilitator and bold reformer, be it as a leading force for dialogue with the North through the Nepad or via the NAM on, say, the Middle East.

This will directly affect the country's position and power in Africa and the South. For instance, if Pretoria cannot secure any Northern support for its African initiatives it will also not be able to live up to its African obligations, roles and promises. The renaissance may be 'African' but it will not be successful without Northern support and financing. This will then also affect South Africa's legitimacy and authority on the African continent.

Herein lies the paradox. South Africa needs to keep the support and inclusion from the North to enable them to keep to their African commitments and promises. On the other hand, it is exactly this high level of Northern interest and interaction with South Africa that causes other African states to question the country's loyalty and authority. So, while South Africa needs to enhance its soft power in both the North and the South, it will require different techniques and will have to include the projection of different images in each instance.

But what is clear is that soft power has an important role to play in maintaining South Africa's emerging middle power behaviour and goals. The question then how is South Africa is going about boosting its soft power?

### **3.2.2 History of Mega-Events in South Africa**

It was mentioned that South Africa's moral authority and soft power has its origins in the country's apartheid struggle; peaceful transition to democracy; image as global protector of human rights; and peace negotiator/keeper/mediator. These aspects simultaneously support

South Africa's emerging middle power status to a certain extent, as well as supply the country with international prestige. In turn this adds to South Africa's moral authority, which is the soft power Pretoria is in a continuous pursuit to maintain and boost. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) states one of its main principles as "promoting a positive image of South Africa" (DFA, 2003: 14). The government then also recognises mega-events (or hallmark events) as potential sources for achieving such an objective, as stated in the South Africa Yearbook 2003/4 (GCIS, 2003/4):

The Government has, since the late 1990s, been actively imaging, branding and marketing South Africa, both directly and by supporting initiatives like...hosting hallmark events, and creating the International Investment Council, International Marketing Council and International Task Force on Information Society and Development.

Some of these hallmark events include the 1998 UN Commission on Human Rights; the Commonwealth Conference in 1999; the 13<sup>th</sup> International AIDS conference in Durban, July 2000; the UN Conference against Racism in 2001; and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) that was held in Johannesburg in 2002. It is obvious that these events all have one thing in common: they all have to do with highly publicised international normative issues. Therefore they fit neatly in South Africa's 'moral authority' image and role and could also enhance this image.

But although these events are relatively large-scale events, they do not come close to drawing the international interest and audience numbers major sporting events do. And as stated by President Nelson Mandela in 1996: "Sport is probably the most effective means of communication in the modern world, bypassing both verbal and written communication and reaching directly out to billions of people worldwide" (Beck, 2004:77). It is also quite clear that the South African government bought the idea that hosting major sporting events are great marketing platforms – as is evident from the considerable amount of international sporting events the country hosted or bid for from 1995 onwards.

Already in 1995 South Africa hosted the Rugby World Cup. This was followed by the Africa Cup of Nations in 1996; the African Games in 1999; and the 2003 Cricket World Cup.

The successful hosting of these events prompted South Africa to bid for the biggest of them all, namely the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 FIFA World Cup. Both these bids were however unsuccessful.

The huge significance South Africa attaches to these events are furthermore evident from the establishment of the South African Sports Commission (SASC) that started operation in April 2000. The commission has also received a greater budget in 2003 and some of its leading responsibilities are all focussed around the bidding and hosting of mega sports events. This is apparent from the South African Yearbook 2003/2004 that names some of the responsibilities as:

Improving the quality of international events hosted by South Africa; enhancing the bidding for and hosting of international events; and assisting federations and organisations that have been granted permission to host international events.

Furthermore, the government also established the International Marketing Council of South Africa (IMC) in August 2000 with the main purpose to “create a positive and compelling brand image for South Africa” (IMC, nd<sup>13</sup>). Among other initiatives and goals this includes exploiting ‘significant worldwide events’ to full extent for their marketing potential. In February 2003 Yvonne Johnston, CEO of the IMC, stated in a speech to the Sport and Recreation Conference that:

I see the business benefits, the entertainment benefits and the fact that sporting events provide a brilliant marketing opportunity to showcase South Africa to the world ...sporting events allow countries to showcase their landscapes, the people, the infrastructure. They also allow one to develop the softer issues such as national pride which ultimately drives the hard issues such as tourism, trade and investment and influence international relations (Johnston, 2003).

All of this has led to South Africa’s bid for what is considered to be the international sporting event with the largest spectator audience. It also equals the Olympic Games as the most demanding event in regards of infrastructure, technology, resources and plain logistics.

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<sup>13</sup> No date was available but the information was retrieved from the website in October 2004.

South Africa's bid for this event, the Fifa 2010 World Cup, was then also announced as the successful bid on 15 May 2004 in Zurich.

### **3.3. SOUTH AFRICA'S BID FOR FIFA 2010**

#### **3.3.1 Overview**

To understand the significance of South Africa's bid for 2010 it should be seen against a background of South Africa's sports history. During 1964 South Africa was suspended from Fifa. In 1974 Fifa expelled South Africa from the organisation (Griffiths, 2000: 78). Besides the universal objections against apartheid, the absurd apartheid-inspired management of South African soccer became an offensive embarrassment for Fifa. For instance, in 1963 South Africa announced that it would be sending an all-white team to Fifa 1966 in England and an all-black side to Fifa 1970 in Mexico (*Mail & Guardian*, 06/11/2003).

The country's expulsion from Fifa was part of a global campaign against apartheid that was aimed at the complete isolation of South Africa. Along with the country's diplomatic and commercial isolation, South Africa was also excluded from most other international sporting events and bodies. During the 2010 bid campaign Thabo Mbeki acknowledged the role Fifa played in fighting apartheid. In a speech to Fifa he said "thank you Fifa for what you did to help us achieve our freedom!" (Mbeki, 2004).

The noted re-inclusion of South Africa in the international community immediately opened doors for South African sport as well. In fact, sport has been one of the spheres that has enjoyed the quickest international re-admittance and acceptance. Already in 1992 the national cricket team competed in the Cricket World Cup in Australia, while the national soccer team (Bafana Bafana) played international matches on home soil (Griffiths, 2000: 16-17). When the country competed in the 1992 Barcelona Games it was of great symbolic importance. By allowing South Africa back into the Olympic Community the world acknowledged that the country was once again accepted as part of the international community. Accordingly, the importance of sport to South Africa's foreign policy gained new heights, as noted in the preceding section.

The international soccer body, Fifa, also welcomed South Africa – now with its inclusive and multi-racial soccer teams and management – back into its ranks. Fifa membership also meant that South Africa could be a potential host of the World Cup. Hence, in October 1997, South Africa announced its intention to bid for Fifa 2006 (Griffiths, 2000: 81).

South Africa was however not the only African country with such aspirations. Morocco, Ghana, Egypt and Nigeria also jumped on the bandwagon. At the end, all except Morocco and South Africa withdrew their bids in order to put forward a single and stronger African bid (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/06/2000). The final round of voting saw South Africa going up against Germany. The controversial announcement of the winner took place in July 2000. The controversy sprouted from South Africa's marginal defeat (12 votes to 11) when New Zealander and Fifa Executive member, Charlie Dempsey, abstained from the vote. In accordance with his Oceania Football Confederation's resolution, Dempsey was supposed to vote for South Africa. This would have meant that Fifa President Sepp Blatter would have had to cast the deciding vote. He was openly in favour of an African World Cup.

Whatever the real reasons behind Dempsey's choice, the fact remains that once again a Northern country was chosen at the expense of an African one. This became a highly publicised issue that caused Fifa to reconsider its voting structures. In 2002 the Fifa executive committee announced that it would be introducing a rotation system in which each football confederation would have a chance to host a football World Cup. Fifa went further and promised the 2010 World Cup to the Confederation of African Football (CAF). Cornelissen (2004b: 1299) argued that because this decision from Fifa had its origins in "South Africa's misfortune during the 2006 campaign, it could perhaps be seen as an early diplomatic triumph for the country". Thus South Africa pursued the 2010 World Cup without hesitation. The bid for this event was officially launched in April 2003 (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/04/2003).

South Africa was in an advantageous position during this second attempt at the World Cup. Its competition was limited to African countries including Morocco, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. And South Africa had an obvious advantage over the African contenders when considering the country's emerging middle power status and relative economic and political

leverage on the continent. Besides, South Africa beat England and almost Germany during the 2006 campaign. Regardless of these factors, South Africa did not leave anything to chance and managed to propose a bid that compared with the best in the world.

No where else was this more evident than in the technical report released by Fifa prior to the voting (Cooper, 2004; Gleeson 2004: 21). The release of the technical report itself was an unprecedented decision since it had never been done before. It would also give the country that performed the best in the technical evaluation a clear advantage over the others. The reason for this is that meeting Fifa's requirements are a major influencing factor when selecting the successful candidate. In this instance South Africa's report placed the country head and shoulders above the rest. This action by Fifa in itself may have pointed to a bias in its preference for South Africa.

The technical requirements are not the only criteria according to which the various football federations' representatives vote. This was evident from the final results of the voting that took place on May 15, 2004. In the final round of voting South Africa received 14 votes, Morocco 10, and Egypt none (*AllAfrica*, 17/05/2004b). Thus, although South Africa was well in the lead with the technical report, Egypt second followed by Morocco in third place, the latter still secured 10 votes. A further point of contention for the South African side was that the four African votes in Fifa (Cameroon, Botswana, Mali and Tunisia) all went to Morocco (*Sunday Times*, 16/05/2004). What made this even more significant was that prior to voting day, the South Africa side was confident that they had secured at least two of the four African votes, namely that of Mali and Botswana (Mokoena & Hadebe, 2004b: 25).

Thus, besides technical requirements, decisions also need to fit into the broader context of personal relationships as well as political and economic relations that may have very little to do with the Soccer World Cup. In the case of Mali, the country's president personally asked the Fifa boss beforehand to vote for South Africa. This gesture was in return for Pretoria financially helping Mali to host the 2002 African Cup of Nations. For reasons still unclear Mali's Amadou Diakite had voted for Morocco instead. The Fifa representative from Botswana, Ismail Bhamjee, is a former South African. Furthermore, Botswana and South

Africa are good neighbours with secure relations and shared interests. It is also believed that Botswana's very lucrative tourism industry would directly benefit from a World Cup being hosted in South Africa. Regardless of Botswana's interests Bhamjee had a personal score to settle, since South Africa did not support him in his campaign for the presidency of the CAF (*Dailynews*, 23/01/2004; Mokoena & Hadebe, 2004b: 25).

Other conditions that have influenced the voting process are found in historical and political ties as well as economic interests. This is what had caused France and Spain to explicitly support Morocco's bid (*Mail & Guardian*, 06/11/2003). Prior to the vote South Africa had received open support from Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Pressly, 2004). Germany has been one of South Africa's top trading partners. Brazil's president Lula da Silva had also pledged his country's support. What is of importance is that Brazilian-South African diplomatic and economic relations have grown in recent years, especially since both are members of the IBSA forum. Clearly this relationship must have played a role in Brazil's siding with South Africa. Danny Jordaan, the CEO for the Bid Committee in the 2006 campaign, had also remained in this position for the 2010 bid. Accordingly he brought along the extensive contacts and relationships that he had established.

In the 2010 bid South Africa had built forth on the 2006 networks and excellent technical record. In addition, Cornelissen (2004b: 1301) pointed out that the general 2006 bid theme of which 'Africa' formed the cornerstone, was continued in 2010. This theme went on to highlight that 'Africa's time has come' (McCullough, 1999). As is further discussed in the next section, the idea that 'It is Africa's Time' has been a crucial part of the South African bid. For instance, after South Africa was announced as the 2010 host nation, Fifa President Sepp Blatter, announced that "it is the beginning of a new era in Africa, in the development of football in Africa...it is a very strong sign to the whole world that we trust Africa" (Obayiuwana, 2004).

Chapter I discussed the potential marketing opportunities and potential resources of power inherent in the bidding and hosting of mega-events. Bidding for mega-events is a costly endeavour and some would argue that an unsuccessful bid is money wasted. This was clearly



the case after England's failed 2006 Fifa bid attempt when the Minister of Sport referred to the costs involved as a 'waste' (Cornelissen, 2004a: 51). On the other hand, there are also those who believe that regardless of whether a bid is successful or not, it still presents an opportunity to market and project chosen images of the relevant country. For instance, when Morocco lost the 2010 bid, Saad Kettani, the head of the unsuccessful bid stated that:

We're not disappointed because we ran a worthy campaign. Billions of TV viewers saw the quality of our presentation yesterday but the final decision is made by 24 people (*AllAfrica*, 17/05/2004a).

The Moroccans still believed that they reached intended target audiences and that the money spent on the bid campaign was in actual fact long-term marketing expenditures that would pay off in the future. This is exactly the view of the South African government, as pointed out in the preceding section. As was the case with bidding and hosting sporting mega-events in general, the South African side believed the Fifa 2010 bid to be an excellent marketing platform for the country. The questions then remain; how and what did South Africa market? Furthermore; why and to whom was the marketing done?

What I would like to show in the following three sections is how South Africa used its Fifa bid in an attempt to enhance its soft power. The argument is based on the idea that South Africa projected certain chosen images of itself that Pretoria assumed would have a favourable effect on how the country is perceived. Although these images were projected to the entire international community, these were intended for specific 'audiences'. The images are also closely related to the foreign policy rhetoric and goals of the South African government. Therefore, the bidding process itself has been intended to serve political and economic ideals (Gratton & Taylor, 2000; Hiller, 2000; Roche, 2000).

Although these images are very much interweaved, I argue that three broad categories can be identified in the South Africa bid for the 2010 games. These images, in no particular order are firstly, 'African Identity/Africa's Benefactor'; secondly, 'Bridge Builder'; and thirdly, 'Efficient, Capable, Leading Country'. As far as was possible the following data are



discussed in chronological order and is mostly presented as reflected in the media, government sources and 2010 Bid Committee over the period January 2003 to June 2004.

### **3.3.2 African Identity/Africa's Benefactor**

The ANC's rise to power in South Africa was largely based on their prominent Third World credentials (Saul, 2004: 78). Therefore, it can hardly be contested that the ANC had a clear 'African identity' during the apartheid struggle. This is then also one image the ANC would and could not sacrifice. This was evident from this statement made shortly after they came to power in 1994: "we share great pride in being African. Our only desire is to contribute to the great African story, to the well being of our continent" (Barber, 2004: 171).

Ten years later these two images still featured prominently during South Africa's bid for the 2010 World Cup. South Africa made sure that its 'unmistakeable African identity' and 'how much it will mean and contribute to the continent if South Africa is to host Fifa 2010' was constantly reflected side by side. The reasons for this vary. For one, the 2010 World Cup had been guaranteed to be hosted in Africa. As a result, the bidding nations had to be able to show just how 'African' they are. Failing to show this could count against the bidding nations – as was evident from the Moroccan approach to the bid. To gain advantage, the Moroccan bid focussed heavily on their close proximity, history and relations to Europe. However, some believed that in doing so Morocco was distancing itself from Africa (Maphumulo, 2004: 59). Also, as stated by Rathbone (2003) "Our (South Africa's) value lies in the fact that we are a truly African bid. Morocco has a chance only because it is Europe's African bid".

South Africa also had to tend to its image in Africa. By this I refer to what was stated about the country's commitment and authority in Africa being questioned by other African nations. Therefore, since Fifa 2010 had to be hosted in Africa, South Africa was presented with the opportunity to simultaneously show how 'African' it was to the Fifa governing body, while also reaffirming its African identity and commitment. In other words, besides from appealing to the Fifa decision makers, South Africa also needed to enhance its soft power in Africa.

With the official launch of the bid in April 2003, then Sport Minister Ngconde Balfour said “the gathering set in motion a campaign that would resonate throughout the country and the entire continent” (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/04/2003). At the launch, Irvin Khosa, the South African World Cup Bid Committee chairperson said that the event was “symbolic and functional” and that: “South Africans were faced with the challenge of ensuring the World Cup was made a memorable spectacle, since it would be the first time Africa would host the event” (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/04/2003). Danny Jordaan, CEO of the SA Bid Committee (and the most prominent figure on the South African side) stated that:

The award of the 2010 Fifa World Cup to South Africa will be the greatest gift to the people of our country and our continent. A gift to all those who are struggling for peace, dignity and democracy anywhere in the world (Olajare, 2004).

South Africa was thus clearly connected to the rest of Africa from the start and did not falter in constantly reaffirming its African identity. The country had also played on its existing soft/symbolic power. More specifically, South Africa reminded Africa and the rest of the world of the ‘African success story’. These statements constantly referred to South Africa’s achievement of a peaceful transition to democracy, human rights, a written and enforced liberal constitution, freedom of speech and related aspects. Interestingly, the South African 2010 Bid Book (2003) even referred to the ‘negotiated revolution’ and quoted:

The political and social miracle that transformed South Africa from an isolated, bitterly divided country on the brink of bloody civil war into a young democracy, a beacon of freedom, peace, hope and reconciliation, exhilarated millions around the world.

But I would also argue that this had been an attempt to revive the existing, although fading memory of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ during the early 1990s. At a time the entire world had been aware, and some had been in awe of South Africa’s transformation to democracy. The country’s ‘glory’ was rapidly fading amongst other international problems namely the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, the bid campaign provided a forum from where the world could be reminded why they (should) have such a high regard for South Africa. In doing so it was an attempt at reviving South Africa’s existing soft/symbolic power.

For instance, Thabo Mbeki said to Fifa's executive committee "we held our third democratic general elections exactly a month ago. In a real sense, these peaceful, free and fair elections were a referendum about our first 10 years of freedom, and a plebiscite to decide the agenda of our Second Decade of Liberation" (Mbeki, 2004). Also, a few weeks before the announcement of the winning bid Nelson Mandela said "there could be few better gifts for us in this year of our celebration than to be awarded the 2010 soccer World Cup" (Jonker, 2004). The 'year of celebration' is of course signifying South Africa's 10 years of democracy as clearly mentioned by Jordaan: "Fifa will name the winning country in the year that coincides with the 10th anniversary of full democracy in my country" (IOL, 2004).

These three examples are representative of the basic tone of the South African side. This definitely did not go unnoticed but had made an impression where it had been intended to, or at least with Fifa's technical evaluation team. Their report spoke of "the positive effect a World Cup would have on the nation-building process in a young democracy" (Gleeson, 2004).

South Africa's emphasis on the country's 10 years of democracy and related achievements was such a major feature in its bid that it infuriated the other bid contestants. For example, Saad Kettani, head of Morocco's bid was quite clear on the fact that he was not at all impressed with South Africa's notion that they deserve the bid because of abolishing apartheid and achieving democracy. He stated: "South Africa is the past. Yet why should the rest of the world say, 'lets keep all of Africa poor and give everything to South Africa?'" (*ThisDay*, 11/02/2004: 24). His frustration signifies what an important boost being a democracy can be for a nation's international image. Because Morocco is a constitutional monarchy (UNDP, 2004), it is even more frustrating since it has nothing to offer in a race against a democracy in this regard.

However, South Africa did not simply highlight its own achievements and successes, but went a step further and hinted that it is possible to achieve the same elsewhere on the continent. This links up with South Africa's attempt to project the image of being Africa's benefactor – as the entire 'African Renaissance' concept is testimony of. If we put South Africa's self-interests aside for a moment, it could be argued that the ANC government's

stated promise, “our only desire is to contribute to the great African story, to the well being of our continent” (Barber, 2004: 171), is evident from the country’s enormous involvement on the continent. The most prominent examples being South Africa’s numerous multilateral involvements like the AU, Nepad, PAP, as well as its conflict resolution attempts and peacekeeping, as discussed in Chapter II. Furthermore, the opportunity to mention South Africa’s involvement and developmental plans for Africa, like the African Renaissance, was never missed during media events.

The image as the ‘benefactor of Africa’ was part of the South African side’s pitch right from the start of the campaign. With the launching of the bid in April 2003, Irvin Khoza said: “I, as an African, want the World Cup to be hosted for the first time in 100 years in Africa. It is in keeping with the ideals of the African Renaissance, the ideals President Thabo Mbeki and our government support” (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/04/2003). As shown below, Mbeki never failed to mention the African Renaissance in combination with the World Cup bid.

During the opening presentations to Fifa in September 2003, Mbeki stated: “The successful hosting of the Fifa World Cup in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible momentum to this African renaissance” (*Mail & Guardian*, 01/10/2003). Eight months later on May 14, 2004, a day before the successful bid nation was chosen, Mbeki referred to the ‘African Renaissance’ three times during his presentation speech to the Fifa Executive Committee (Mbeki, 2004).

In the first instance he stated that Fifa’s decision to guarantee the World Cup to Africa was a sign that the organisation had shown to all Africans a commitment to support the African Renaissance. More importantly, in the second and third instances Mbeki used the ‘renaissance’ discourse in conjunction with South Africa’s 10 years of democracy and that all South Africans support the idea of an African Renaissance. The point was repeated that South Africa’s third democratic elections was a mandate from the South African people “that they want to see a South Africa that has made decisive advances in the national effort to build a society of which all humanity would be proud. They said they (South Africans) want to see an African continent that has taken a giant step forward towards its renaissance” (Mbeki, 2004).

Thus, the image projected was that the entire South African population consider themselves to be Africans. The image was also created that the country's entire population support the government's initiatives to develop and uplift their fellow African brothers. It can therefore be argued that the intention behind this had been that Africa should recognise and accept that South Africa's authority and ideals on the continent was in their best interests, and that this was something that African nations must support.

To conclude, the image South Africa had been sending to Africa and the world came across clearly. In an interview with BBC Sport a day after South Africa won the bid, Fifa President, Sepp Blatter said:

“To entrust South Africa to organise this World Cup is special because it is a country which has suffered. The country came from the ashes but has now enjoyed 10 years of freedom and international connections in sport...with South Africa being a multi-cultural and multi-racial country, it is a dignified representative of Africa for the organisation of the World Cup” (Obayiuwana, 2004).

Although South Africa did project an image of being a ‘dignified representative of Africa’, it also built forth on its image as being a ‘dignified representative of all’. South Africa likes to be seen as the neutral and morally justified ‘bridge builder’ between North and South or between conflicting parties.

### **3.3.3. Bridge Builder**

South Africa has a foot in each camp – one in the developing world and one in the developed world. But this is by no means odd behaviour for a country such as South Africa. In fact it is considered typical (emerging) middle power behaviour<sup>14</sup>. It was stated in Chapter II that Cox (1997: xxvii and 1996:244) views the ‘middle’ in middle power as reference to “working in the middle towards cooperative internationalism”. Also, emerging middle powers possess features of both worlds that enable them to understand the situation and

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<sup>14</sup> It was stated in Chapter 2 that Cox (1997: xxvii and 1996:244) views the ‘middle’ in middle power as reference to “working in the middle towards cooperative internationalism”. It was also stated that the unique position and situation of emerging middle powers (i.e. possessing features of both worlds) enable them to understand the situation and views of both worlds, and therefore they can form a link between the two worlds

views of both worlds and therefore they can form a link between the two worlds. In addition, South Africa has short and long-term interests that are directly affected by both worlds.

As a result this geographic, material, political and symbolic position South Africa occupies between North and South, rich and poor, developed and developing has been dictating the country's foreign policy since 1994. Accordingly, South Africa likes to play the role of a representative for both the North and the South. It is able to "understand and articulate the views of both sides in the world's economic divide, between the developed North and the developing South" (Barber, 2004: 158).

The 'bridge builder' image is also the second prominent image South Africa projected during the Fifa 2010 bid campaign. In the previous discussions on the images South Africa projected, this issue was touched upon. Here I would like to focus on how government and bid officials, as well as the media, reinforced and projected South Africa's image and role as bridge builder.

It has been noted in the press that South Africa's bid had a subtle but clear political theme. Alfred (2004) described the theme as: "Africa, the basket case continent in the eyes of many, has the ability to host an international showpiece event".

Such a view is relevant when we consider certain given statements. In April 2003 former Sport Minister Ngconde Balfour said that when the African host nation was announced "we will rise as one and together with the rest of Africa – our confidence in our people and continent will be vindicated" (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/04/2003).

We should also consider the following statement by Mbeki (2004). In a speech he delivered to the Fifa Executive Committee, and in reference to Fifa's decision to guarantee that an African country will host the 2010 World Cup, he said:

Through this decision, you conveyed the message to all Africans, both on the continent and the African Diaspora, that you are ready and willing to accompany us on our journey of hope, and give us the strength and stamina we need to traverse the difficult terrain that separates us from Africa's renaissance.

Thus, it can be said that South Africa's projected image as a bridge builder showed two characteristics during the bid. In the first place South Africa wanted to represent Africa as a continent that was capable of hosting a mega-event. But this is not just any event. It is considered to be of such a magnitude and on such a scale that it would require the kind of resources and skills that falls in the exclusive domain of Northern states.

In the second place, South Africa acknowledged that Africa needs the support of other nations. It then also appealed to the relevant nations to lend their support – be it financial or a show of faith. When we look at South Africa's other initiatives it is clear that this support is supposed to come from the North. The image of a bridge builder is neatly summarised by Mbeki in a speech he delivered at a banquet in honour of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in January 2004. Said Mbeki:

I am very pleased that your visit to Africa includes a number of countries (including Ghana, Ethiopia and Kenya). This is consistent with your concern to support our continent to meet its political economic and social goals, centred on the strengthening of democracy and the defeat of poverty and underdevelopment, and represented by the African Union and Nepad (New Partnership for Africa's Development) (Pressly, 2004).

This visit by Schröder in January 2004 came at a time when the countdown to Fifa's announcement of the 2010 host nation in May was gathering speed. Schröder had also publicly stated his backing for the South African bid and in return, Mbeki thanked him for his support (Mokgola, 22/01/2004). However, Schröder could not guarantee at that stage that Germany's vote would go to South Africa since it was not his choice to make. The decision resided with Germany's soccer chiefs and specifically Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder. Nevertheless, this diplomatic show, wrapped in the context of the 2010 bid, was evidence of the bridge builder image South Africa has been actively attempting to enhance.

Lastly, I would like to argue that South Africa's conduct during the whole campaign resembled a country that wishes to enhance the ideas that it always takes the moral high ground, that the country can be trusted by all and that it is everyone's 'friend'. If such behaviour is always upheld by South Africa is of course debatable. What is important is that



these ideas were set forward by the South African side. Such behaviour adequately served to support an image as a bridge builder.

To corroborate, during the campaign South Africa never publicly launched an attack against the other bidding nations. This is not to say that there weren't more subtle 'accusations' from the South African side. For instance, the *Mail & Guardian* (06/11/2003) noted that during the bid "South Africa's superiority as a brand within Africa is promoted". The Bid Book highlighted certain South African features such as a 'mature media environment'. Other African nations do not possess this feature. Then again, the other bidding nations – Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – do not have most of the features South Africa has. If South Africa mentions its democratic success the other are left out in the cold. On the other hand these cannot be considered open and negative attacks and South Africa could still come off as morally intact.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the others. Both Morocco and Egypt attacked South Africa's image and bid. Egypt, for example, accused the South African Parliamentary Speaker, Frene Ginwala, of making "hideous accusations" against the Fifa executive members (*AllAfrica*. 26/01/2004). Allegedly Ginwala said that picking "the African Parliament is not like Fifa, which can be bought by money". By implication she accused Fifa of being corrupt. Yet the statement made by Ginwala in January 2004, was completely taken out of context. The Egyptian side later conceded to this and withdrew the accusation, but it was too late. In addition, other African ministers pointed to South Africa as being "absolutely confident that it will host the World Cup because it bought the votes of members" (*AllAfrica*. 26/01/2004).

The Moroccan side referred to South Africa's high crime rate and HIV/Aids rate. South Africa however did not respond, though definitely not due to a lack of negative material on Morocco. There is the unresolved matter of Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara; bomb explosions in Casablanca in 2003; and Moroccan terrorist networks linked to the Madrid train-bombs in April 2004 (Cornish, 2004b: 14; *The Economist*, 10/04/2004: 22-23). Danny Jordaan, CEO of SA Bid Committee simply stated that he and the rest of South Africa would not be drawn into "mudslinging tactics":



The other bidding countries can do and say what they like. South Africa will not stoop to any below-the-belt tactics or comments about other bidding countries' campaigns. We want to win this bid fairly and honestly and on our merits. There will be no mud-slinging from our side (Cooper, 2004).

It was also evident in the media that the South African side had succeeded in their attempt to portray the country as “morally honest”. The *Sunday Times* reported that “honesty has been a touchstone of the South African bid from the beginning” (Alfred, 2004). After South Africa was awarded the bid, Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils pointed out that it was – among other things – the country’s “moral high ground” that secured the bid (Alfred & Mkhize, 2004: 1).

Ironically, in June 2004, shortly after Fifa announced that South Africa had won the bid, news of grand-scale corruption and match-fixing within the South African Football world emerged (Mokoena & Hadebe, 2004a). Numerous coaches and referees were implicated and some arrested. Of interest here is that police investigations have been conducted for months previously but arrests only followed after South Africa won the bid. This could of course have been pure coincidence. On the other hand it could also have been a deliberate attempt to keep South Africa’s image clean and honest as long as the country was more internationally visible than usual for the duration of the Fifa bid. If Morocco and Egypt had learned of this during the campaign they would probably have created a lot of public awareness surrounding the issue.

South Africa managed to avoid such an embarrassment and maintained the image as a morally intact bridge builder that every other state in the world could trust. This level of commitment to maintaining the above image could also be found in South Africa’s portrayal of itself as the most efficient, capable and leading country on the continent.

#### **3.3.4. Efficient, Capable, Leading Country**

To put forth a bid, with the best possible chance of success, South Africa had to comply with Fifa’s strict technical requirements. As can be expected, bid and government officials constantly made statements that reflected the country’s best features and accomplishments. This was done to reiterate its technological development, growing economy, sophisticated


infrastructure and the rest. As stated in Chapter I, bidding for and hosting mega-events create opportunities to showcase a country's new technologies, investment opportunities, and possible tourist destinations (Gratton & Taylor, 2000: 181; Roche, 2000: 10). Therefore, by projecting an image of an efficient, capable and leading country during the bid, South Africa also implied that it has the ability to host a high-profile mega-event like a Soccer World Cup. Here too there was an opportunity to market the country to a wider audience than merely the Fifa delegations and inspectors. Bidding for Fifa has been the perfect opportunity to project an image of having an 'ability' and 'capability' that stretches beyond simply playing host to a mega-event.

In this instance I am specifically identifying the North as an extremely important 'audience' to this projected South African image. By showcasing South Africa as an efficient, capable and leading country (as required of any potential World Cup host), South Africa was also projecting an image that would appeal to the North. Why specifically the North? On the face of it I would argue that in the case of South Africa the above named image is less important to project to Africa than it is to project to the North and non-African Southern states. There are at least three main reasons for this.

First, as shown by Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan (1998), Africa and specifically Southern Africa is well aware of South Africa's capabilities, power and importance. This is not necessarily the case with Northern countries. Second, South Africa aims at inspiring investor confidence in itself and the continent. It is from the Northern countries where the investment is supposed to come. Thus, the North must constantly be made aware of South Africa's position and efforts. But South-South trade must also be inspired and South Africa must maintain its respected position in the eye of for instance, fellow IBSA members. Third, South Africa enjoys preferential treatment from the North. To maintain this South Africa must constantly show that it is still committed to its reforms, like neo-liberal economic policies and democratic practices, domestically as well as promoting it to the rest of Africa. As a result South Africa must then retain the North's confidence in its leadership and authority in Africa. This is exemplified by the country's strong positions in organisations such as the AU, organs like the APSC and its leadership in initiatives such as Nepad.

South Africa already had an advantage in terms of its image as an efficient, capable and leading country at the start of the 2010 bid. South Africa had hosted a number of other major games. A few years previously South Africa had bid to host Fifa 2006 but lost to Germany by one vote. Nevertheless, South Africa had beaten other major candidates like England. This had revealed that South Africa was capable of operating at 'Northern levels' so to speak. There was another advantage, as noted by Jordaan: "the sporting infrastructure of our country has already been rated as 'ready to host the event' by the 2006 Fifa Evaluation Team led by Alan I. Rothenberg". It was also made perfectly clear that South Africa already had 80 percent of the needed infrastructure to host a World Cup (*Mail & Guardian*, 19/11/2003).

It was not solely the country's bid for 2006 that had to show that it was ready for 2010. South Africa also matched Fifa's requirements for the 2010 bid – as was the case with the technical report. This was an important aspect to project to the North. As the 2010 bidding contest started to heat up in early in 2004, the South African side became extremely vocal about their highly developed economy, infrastructure and telecommunications capabilities. In February 2004 Jordaan stated:



We are not saying you just have to give us the World Cup because of this and that, or because we came so close the last time. We are saying that South Africa is the most qualified of the bidding nations and it is very clear. We have surpassed the Fifa requirements. We have met every standard set by the world body for football...we have the facilities: hotels, telecom facilities, stadia requirements, road network, transport system, strong currency and the economy to support a venture like this. The government is in full support. What else is required? (Olajare, 2004).

South Africa's image of maintaining high standards in the above-named features received another boost in May 2004 when Fifa decided to release the technical report on all the contestants. The reason for this was that South Africa's technical report placed it head and shoulders above the other competitors. The widely publicised report also stated that South Africa was the most viable candidate to host the World Cup. The South African side probably had not expected this, but they could definitely exploit it. It contributed to the country's image as an efficient, capable, attractive and growing international actor, a country with which the North would want to deal, business wise and politically. It is clear that the

South African side placed the country's commercial possibilities in just such a context. The SA 2010 Bid Book (2003), presented to Fifa on 1 October 2003, as well as the official bid website portrayed it as follows:

Our economic status is clear and stable and our prospects are excellent; so, many Fifa sponsors continue to invest heavily in South Africa. Furthermore, our stadiums and transport network, our cutting edge IT framework, our technology and communications systems, our hotels and accommodation capacity, our human administration skills and our marketing ability: in all these areas, South Africa can compare with any in Africa, indeed any in the world;

And then, the real crowd pleaser:

Maybe the strongest dimension of this bid, the compelling reason why South Africa is ready, is to be found in our commercial maturity, physical infrastructure and human skills. Yes, we have the will. We also have the tools.

Building forth on the 2010 Bid Book's content Jordaan stated "our bid is based on internationally-established business principles and is substantially funded by leading multinational companies" (Olajare, 2004). Consequently both the Bid Book and Jordaan drew attention to the involvement of multinational companies in the bid and to South Africa's internationally-established business principles.

There is arguably no better way to project a business-friendly image than to show that multinationals and others in the private sector have been eager to invest in South Africa and the World Cup. Therefore right from the start, government and bid officials continuously urged the private sector to invest in the World Cup. For example, during the high profile Presidential Awards in March 2003, President Mbeki pleaded with the corporate world to support the bid (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/04/2003).

However, many multinationals were supporting the bid from its early stages. In April 2003 SuperSport sport channel provided R10-million for the campaign. Jordaan described it as a "booster rocket" for the South African campaign (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/04/2003). In September 2003 SABMiller made a sponsorship of R12-million (*Mail & Guardian*, 11/09/2003). By May 2004 many more were already involved. Under these were counted

BMW, Adidas, South African Airways, Anglo American, Momentum Life, Philips, Southern Sun and First National Bank (*Sunday Times*, 09/05/2004a: 22). Others waited to see if South Africa's bid was successful or not. Some did commit themselves to sponsorships provided that the South African bid was successful. For instance, Adidas, Coca-Cola and Philips had confirmed interests of R326-million; Anglo American, SABMiller, BMW and Vodacom pledged R435-million; MasterCard, McDonald's and Yahoo! had a promised R204-million (*Sunday Times*, 09/05/2004a).

Bid officials, politicians and business people also made sure that new pledges, sponsorships, and investments received huge media coverage. Towards the end of the campaign the bid company announced that it had secured 42% of its targeted R2312- million from big-name multinationals. Such behaviour by the multinationals sends the message that they are confident that South Africa is able to host a mega-event of World Cup proportions. This should appeal to Northern interests. But if Northern business interests wondered where the South African government was in all of this they did not need to look further than the Fifa 'List of Requirements'.

The entire Fifa bid was marked by the complete support from the South African government (Neveling, 2004:21). The most credible example of this was probably the declaration of guarantees submitted to Fifa. These guarantees came from various relevant government authorities and Ministers in answer to the List of Requirements issued by Fifa (SA 2010 Bid Book, 2003). It also stated that: "The Government shall ensure that all special laws, regulations and decrees necessary to establish the conditions required for organising and staging the 2010 Fifa World Cup are enacted and enforced."

Besides highlighting multinational involvement and total support from government, South Africa had additional resources at its disposal. The Bid Company made sure that the entire South African campaign was practically flawless, at least as far as was publicly visible. Doubtless this must have projected a general image of a country with organised, capable and confident people, businesses and practices.

When the Fifa delegates visited the country on their routine inspections they had nothing but the highest praise for the South African effort (*Mail & Guardian*, 06/11/2003). Besides first class treatment, they were also addressed and accompanied by various political figures, cabinet ministers, and business people (Gleeson, 2004:21). The importance of incorporating the South African media during this time was invaluable. It mobilised public support for the bid and was something the Fifa delegates encountered wherever they went in South Africa. The general image projected was that the South African bid was supported from the grassroots level right through to government. South Africa's 2010 Bid Book also proclaimed:

In every city, town and district, in every gleaming office block and dusty settlement, South Africans truly believe our country can host a magnificent Fifa World Cup in 2010. This popular support is broad and deep, and strengthens our mission.

This was a very different situation than during the South African bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games. Here a great part of the population was against such an undertaking. Also, Cornelissen (2004b: 1297) argued that, as opposed to the 2004 bid that was regarded as a 'white' bid, the 2010 bid was seen as a 'black' bid. Accordingly a greater numbers of the population was included. It could be indicating that the South African population has bought the government's promotion of the potential benefits associated with hosting mega sporting events.

Whatever the case may be, the importance of mass-scale public support becomes apparent when looking at the impact a lack of such support had for the credibility and competency of the other African candidates. The Tunisian campaign was criticised for a low level of public interest. When the Fifa delegates inspected Tunisia it was even reported that a large number of Tunisians were not even aware that their country was in the race to host the World Cup. Also, in contrast to the South African bid, Tunisia's bid was criticised for its lack of a "punchy theme" and a clear figurehead to lead the bid (Mokoena, 01/02/2004). The theme went something along the line of 'Roman remains, modern sophistication, yet totally Tunisian' (Tunisia2010, 2003), compared to South Africa's more successful focus on 'Africa's World Cup' and 'Africa's time has come'.

In Morocco's case, it was widely noted in the press that the country's football federation was hardly involved. They predominantly relied on foreign consultants (Gleeson, 2004: 19). Therefore, Morocco's bid sent out an image (most likely unintentionally) that the country lacked local skilled and competent people. Besides the negative reflection of this on the bid, it could also prove harmful to other potential foreign business interests beside the World Cup.

South Africa's last attempt and opportunity to boost its bid was the delegation it sent to Zurich for the final announcement of who would host the 2010 World Cup. It was an important last opportunity for signalling South Africa's stature to the international community – at least as far as the bid was concerned. If anything, the South African delegation was a perfect example of how the country's entire bid had been conducted: an 'over-the-top' display and reminder to Fifa and millions of people watching the proceedings of basically everything the country has achieved during the last 10 years.

All the South African bid officials were of course included in the delegation. President Thabo Mbeki also addressed Fifa in Zurich, preceding the announcement. This still showed that South Africa connected the importance of leadership and government backing to the Fifa bid and sent this image into the world. This was a significant message and one that the other bidding nations completely missed. No other African head of state accompanied their delegations. Further political representation in the delegation was in the form of some ministers. Amongst them the former Minister of Sport, Ngconde Balfour and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was counted. On the economic side, South Africa was represented by numerous prominent black empowerment businessmen (Matshikiza, 2004: 37). Rumour even had it that Charlize Theron, who had won the Oscar for Best Actress a few months before the announcement, would join the delegation (*Sunday Times*, 09/05/2004b). This did not happen but had surely created more publicity for the bid.

Nevertheless, it was probably the people in the delegation with 'symbolic' significance that came over the strongest. For this final reminder of the 'African success story' the delegation included South African Nobel Peace Prize winners Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and F.W. De Klerk. They are possibly the most public individuals involved in South



Africa's peaceful democratic transformation. This 'symbolic significance' is nothing less than the exact soft power that has supported South Africa's moral authority and emerging middle power behaviour since 1994.

Once again the importance of soft/symbolic power becomes apparent when it is compared to the other bids. Neither Egypt nor Morocco made proper use of their rich and millennia-old heritage to portray a stronger image of their nations and to secure the bid. Therefore they never employed the full potential of their soft power and furthermore did nothing to improve it either. Matshikiza (2004: 37) said that "the North Africans could still have put themselves in there with a fighting chance if they could have bothered to try". He mentioned the late Moroccan King Hussan II – that claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad – and Egypt's Pharaohs, pyramids and the rest that could have been emphasised and used to signify the countries' soft/symbolic power. The same way South Africa used 'Madiba Magic', Tutu and De Klerk.

South Africa's image to the North and the world during the entire campaign was that of a competent, committed and attractive leader. Furthermore, it was also the intention to show that the South African government and business sectors are committed and more than capable to host the World Cup, and that South Africa in general has a stable and attractive business environment even major multinationals recognise as a worthwhile investment destination.

### **3.4. CONCLUSION**

The preceding assessment of the South African bid for Fifa 2010 was done to show that the country was actively seeking ways to boost its soft power. It became clear that such an attempt involved the projection of certain chosen images to the rest of the international community. It is also clear that the projected images were to a large extent in line with the roles the country already assumed in its post-apartheid era (i.e. its emerging middle power behaviour). These images then also supported the country's foreign policy objectives.

As was show, the images were also intended to reflect favourably on South Africa in the eyes of both the Northern and Southern countries, be it to rally support for future initiatives and



leadership positions South Africa may want to pursue or, in support of existing initiative, roles and relationships.

Earlier in this study it was stated that for a nation to achieve desired outcomes, less direct ways of exerting power also exist. The idea is to get other states to “want what you want” as opposed to simply get them to “do as you want.” It was furthermore stated that the ability to receive such voluntary cooperation and interest in ones country has to do with how well a state can manage and make use of its soft power. Therefore a country’s culture, ideology, norms and foreign policy must be more than merely acceptable to other states – it must be attractive.

Thus, based on the statements and behaviours of the bid and government officials during the bid, as well as the images they chose to project, I would argue that the bid was deliberately used in an attempt to enhance the country’s soft power. South Africa’s winning bid could even affirm that the country was able to successfully deploy its soft power.



## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

#### 4.1. CONCLUSION

It was stated that because the international system is increasingly becoming more complex, the resources that generate power have become much more complex. Therefore, states continuously search for new power resources and better power conversion becomes crucial. This has caused that less prominent, intangible and new power resources are gaining greater interest from states and therefore also recognition from international relations analysts. This study dealt with soft or symbolic or co-optive power as potential, intangible powers and power resources. It was also attempted to show how South Africa was actively trying to boost its soft power by making use of the Fifa 2010 World Cup bid as a marketing platform for the country. The importance for a study like this becomes apparent when considering the country's growing involvement in bidding and hosting such events and its centrality to foreign policy.

The necessary approach required the investigation of South Africa's regional and global position and role. It was also necessary to assess exactly what South Africa's soft power entails and why it is important to the country's particular situation. This was then applied to the South African bid for the 2010 World Cup where the focus moved to how the country's bid and government officials attempted to enhance South Africa's soft power.

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It became apparent that South Africa's global position and role is without a doubt that of a middle power, more specifically an emerging middle power. This was derived from qualifying the country according to existing criteria ascribed to emerging middle powers. It was shown how the country's emerging middle power role manifests in its dealing with the North and with Africa and the South. The discussion pointed out that South Africa is constantly and enthusiastically building its emerging middle power role in order to expand upon it, but also to sustain its authority, legitimacy and credibility. Not only is this to be

expected but it is also a necessity for maintaining the country's long-term self-interests and goals, initiatives and leadership in the region, continent and possibly also on a global level.

In relation to Africa and most others in the developing world, it is possible for South Africa to employ certain amounts of relational power. Soft power is however still crucial, especially to ensure voluntary cooperation for South African initiatives and to ensure that its authority is perceived as legitimate. At the global level, South Africa's relational power is insignificant and the country is basically left with its soft or symbolic power. Soft power is thus important in dealing with the North as well as the South. But it is becoming more difficult to maintain its soft power as time passes. As was shown, after 1994 the New South Africa had great moral authority and tremendous symbolic power that helped in supporting the actions and initiatives the country took or pursued. This symbolic power is the basis for, or rather, it is the soft power with which this study is concerned. South Africa's soft power ensured that it received unprecedented inclusion and voluntary cooperation from the international community – both North and South. However, South Africa has to continually maintain and expand its soft power.

There are numerous reasons for this. The ones I identified in 3.2.1., and that are most relevant to this study include firstly, that South Africa's 'flavour of the month' status is fading. The world has developed new problems and causes and therefore also new victims, heroes and villains that step to the fore during the past ten years since South Africa achieved democracy. Second, South Africa's growing prestige and power in Africa poses a potential threat to fellow African countries. Also, South Africa's relationships with the North (unequalled by any other the North may have with an African state) create feelings of resentment and doubt in regards to where South Africa's loyalty and commitment lies. This also creates problems for South Africa's 'African Identity'. Africa's questioning of South Africa's commitment to the continent's development are further enhanced by the country's relationship and dealings with other Southern states and emerging middle powers that are not located on the African continent. Thirdly, there are American-led lurches towards growing unilateralism and decreasing multilateralism in the international system (Bischoff, 2003: 186). This is rather significant for South Africa since the country predominantly relies on

multilateralism for its manoeuvring and partly to gain greater legitimacy. Lastly, South Africa's reformist agendas (2.3.1 & 2.3.2.), if pushed too far or to the point where it threatens the interests of the dominant Northern powers, may experience a backlash from the North. This could have the effect that South Africa loses the preferential treatment and support it currently enjoys from the North. The consequences of this could also affect South Africa's position and leadership in Africa and the South.

It is therefore apparent that South Africa has a significant interest in maintaining and enhancing its soft power. This is also exactly what was done during the Fifa 2010 bid. In the past, South Africa pursued and hosted numerous mega-events. These included summits and conferences like the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and mega sports events such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Though, never before did South Africa host an event by the scale of the Soccer World Cup. The bidding campaign for this event provided unprecedented opportunities for marketing any desired image and aspects regarding one's country. These opportunities will of course increase substantially when the actual event is taking place.

Therefore South Africa pursued the 2004 Olympic Games and the 2006 Soccer World Cup of which both bids turned out to be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, South Africa followed-up these bids with the 2010 World Cup bid, with even more vigour than before. This time the bid was successful and it too presented a forum from where to market the country. It was noted that South Africa attempted to enhance its soft power by projecting certain images of the country to the world at the same time as the main 2010 campaign was conducted. These images were intended to create favourable images of South Africa to the intended audiences. The three main projected images were identified as firstly, African Identity/Africa's Benefactor; secondly, Bridge Builder and thirdly, Efficient, Capable, Leading Country.

Accordingly, South Africa projected to Africa that the country is indeed 'African' and that the entire South African population – black and white – consider themselves African. The South African government also reaffirmed its support and commitment to initiatives and promises aimed at uplifting Africa. South Africa's message to the North and other non-

African Southern states was equally clear. South Africa portrayed itself as a competent, committed and attractive leader in Africa – a country that abides by international (Western) economic and political standards.

In other words, South Africa attempted to show that it is the personification of the West's democratic, open-market model it envisions and promotes everywhere in the world, a country with a stable and attractive business environment that even major multinationals have faith in. Lastly, to the world in general, South Africa reaffirmed its neutral position as intermediary between North and South and between conflicting parties. But it did more than that. By projecting South Africa as an honest and neutral moral authority it also supported the country's image as a mediator and peace broker. Thus, South Africa emerged as the bridge builder that every other state in the world should trust.

It became apparent how South Africa's emerging middle power position, foreign policy, soft power, and bid to host the Fifa 2010 World Cup tie into each other. In turn, a significant amount of the country's soft/symbolic power came as a result of its foreign policy (emphasis on, for instance, human rights and global economic reform) and emerging middle power characteristics (bridge builder, regional leader, and reformer).

Thus, because South Africa wanted to boost its soft power during the Fifa 2010, the images it chose to project are a reflection of the country's emerging middle power position and foreign policy of the day. All of these combined are supposed to support South Africa's long term goals and self-interests. This may even be more important in South Africa's dealings with Africa than with the North.

In the region and on the continent South Africa's hard power has gone from strength to strength. So much so that it is often perceived as a threat by fellow African states (3.2.1.). As was noted in the 2010 bid campaign, there is a general feeling of resentment growing in Africa against South Africa. This is where the importance of South Africa's soft power becomes clear. It has the potential to supply the country with a more attractive image on the continent. It could also legitimise its authority and leadership. In doing so South Africa can

achieve the voluntary cooperation is so desperately needs. As a result it is crucial to constantly maintain and expand its soft power.

#### **4.2. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

In 2010 South Africa will host the World Cup. If nothing else it can be expected that this event will play host to the largest ever marketing campaign undertaken by the government. Furthermore, the event is also guaranteed to draw the biggest in the corporate world because there is money to be made and because of the tremendous and diverse audience soccer has. It will furthermore be interesting to note to what extent domestic and foreign corporate sectors bought into the government's portrayal of South Africa. Also, how much alike is the images of South Africa that the corporate players reflect in their advertising, to those that the South African government project?

Probably the more important aspect to investigate is how Pretoria will market itself during the actual 2010 Games. What images will the government project? To what extent will it reflect the images that were identified in the bid campaign? Will the projected images in six years time still support and reflect the country's foreign policy, while playing heavily on soft power? Lastly, this study's concept of soft power is also worthy of further investigation. For example, is the significance of soft power gaining ground against states' preference for more traditional and tangible power resources? This is especially significant since it may be argued that the behaviour of the superpower of the day shows exactly the opposite.

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